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 Abstract 
As global development trends continue, planners and social scientists of the future will 
have an increasingly pressing responsibility to effectively and sensitively address and interact 
with informal development.  This report seeks to provide theoretical research to expand the 
knowledge base of planners and social scientists with respect to informal development.  It aims 
to begin to explore and explain how informal development and living conditions interact, and to 
understand what the role of the planner and social scientist should be in interfacing with informal 
development in the future.  Through case study this report considers two distinct typologies of 
informal settlements in order to compare and contrast factors in each settlement‘s history and 
development, living conditions, and overarching administrative relationships to identify trends in 
the development and manifestation of informal settlements.  
 
 
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction .........................................................................................................1 
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review ................................................................................................3 
Informality, Informal Settlements, and Slums ..................................................................3 
Living Conditions ............................................................................................................5 
Infrastructure ...................................................................................................................6 
Land Tenure ....................................................................................................................8 
Housing Unit ...................................................................................................................9 
Neighborhood Unit ........................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 3 - Methodology ..................................................................................................... 13 
Introduction to the Research .................................................................................................. 13 
Defining Research and the Research Process ..................................................................... 14 
Research Design ................................................................................................................ 15 
Case Study Protocol .......................................................................................................... 16 
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 16 
Research Procedures .......................................................................................................... 17 
Case Study Questions ........................................................................................................ 18 
CHAPTER 4 - Kibera ............................................................................................................... 19 
History .................................................................................................................................. 20 
Living Conditions ................................................................................................................. 23 
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 24 
Services ......................................................................................................................... 24 
Physical Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 38 
Land Tenure ...................................................................................................................... 41 
Housing Unit ..................................................................................................................... 43 
Neighborhood Unit ............................................................................................................ 45 
Concluding Comments .......................................................................................................... 46 
 v 
CHAPTER 5 - Sultanbeyli ........................................................................................................ 47 
History .................................................................................................................................. 49 
Living Conditions ................................................................................................................. 54 
Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 54 
Services ......................................................................................................................... 54 
Physical Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 59 
Land Tenure ...................................................................................................................... 60 
Housing Unit ..................................................................................................................... 63 
Neighborhood Unit ............................................................................................................ 66 
Concluding Comments .......................................................................................................... 67 
CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 68 
Examining the Origins of Informal Development............................................................... 69 
Examining the Determinants of Living Conditions ............................................................ 70 
Implications on Interfacing with Informal Development .................................................... 74 
CHAPTER 7 - References ......................................................................................................... 77 
  
 vi 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: The Living Conditions Diamond ...............................................................................6 
Figure 4.1: Kibera ..................................................................................................................... 19 
Figure 4.2: Villages of Kibera ................................................................................................... 23 
Figure 4.3: Informal Water Pipe Network Kibera ...................................................................... 31 
Figure 4.4: Methods for Dealing with Full Latrines in Kibera .................................................... 36 
Figure 4.5: Aerial photograph of Kibera .................................................................................... 46 
Figure 5.1: Locating Sultanbeyli ............................................................................................... 47 
Figure 5.2: Fatih Boulevard, Sultanbeyli ................................................................................... 49 
Figure 5.3: Businesses along Fatih Boulevard, Sultanbeyli ........................................................ 58 
Figure 5.4: Sultanbeyli from Above .......................................................................................... 60 
Figure 5.5: Gecekondu in Istanbul ............................................................................................. 63 
Figure 5.6: Aerial photograph of Sultanbeyli ............................................................................. 66 
  
 vii 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Acceptable Improved Water Access................................................7 
Table 2.2: Characteristics of Acceptable Improved Sanitation Access .........................................8 
Table 2.3: Characteristics of Durable Housing Units ................................................................. 10 
Table 4.1: Latrine Models in Kibera .......................................................................................... 34 
Table 4.2: Externally Funded Latrines by Village ...................................................................... 36 
Table 4.3: Education Facilities in Kibera ................................................................................... 40 
Table 4.4: Health Facilities in Kibera ........................................................................................ 40 
Table 4.5: Adapted Characteristics of Durable Housing Units in Kibera .................................... 44 
Table 5.1: Turkish Administrative Structure .............................................................................. 53 
Table 5.2: Typical Acceptable Water Access in Sultanbeyli ...................................................... 56 
Table 5.3: Typical Improved Sanitation Access in Sultanbeyli .................................................. 57 
Table 5.4: Adapted Characteristics of Durable Housing Units in Sultanbeyli ............................. 65 
Table 6.1: Economic Context Comparison ................................................................................ 74 
  
  1 
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Across the globe in Africa, the streets are alive with activity.  Young children climb a hill 
in their village.  Vendors call out to passersby as they sell their wares from kiosks that line the 
streets.  A group of women and children bustle past with large cans of water in tow.  Yet this 
scene is far from forgettable.  The hill upon which the children play is no earthen mound, but a 
pile of rotting refuse.  The streets, haphazard lined with huts of mud and corrugated steel.  In this 
village, collecting water from common access points is a tiresome daily necessity for women and 
children.  This is an informal settlement; this is Kibera.  Further north in Turkey, automobiles 
move along wide, paved streets waving flags of support for two soccer teams playing in the 
evening.  As two men argue politics in a climate-controlled kebab shop off the street, a faint bell 
announces each new customer‘s entrance.  Above in a cluster of fully serviced apartments a 
family watches a movie together in their living room.  This urban environment, indistinguishable 
from any other urban area in Istanbul, is an informal settlement; this is Sultanbeyli.  Kibera and 
Sultanbeyli are two settlements linked by a common definition that exist in juxtaposition.  Both 
settlements developed informally in conjunction with large spikes in rural-urban migration, yet 
the quality of life and living conditions within these settlements vary drastically and there is very 
little inquiry as to why in current literature.   
Population counts around the world show that global society is urbanizing.  In point of 
fact, statistics show a trend of alarmingly rapid urbanization across the globe, particularly in 
developing countries.  While urbanization is not a new phenomenon, it is important to consider 
the implications this trend of rapid urbanization has on global development.  In the next few 
years, for the first time ever, the urban population of the world will outnumber the rural 
population.  Arguably, this milestone has already passed given the inaccuracies of Third World 
censuses (Davis, 2006).  This rapid urbanization represents a monumental paradigm shift in the 
location and concentration of the global population, and it is not without serious concerns.  It is 
estimated that 95 percent of population growth over the next generation will occur in the urban 
areas of developing countries (Davis, 2006).  With limited capacities‘ for governance, inadequate 
planning, and inaccessible formal land markets, these urban areas in developing countries are 
often ill equipped to responsibly manage population influx through legitimate formal 
frameworks.  As a result, many are forced to pursue development outside the formal framework, 
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often manifesting in poor conditions:  ―In 2001, 924 million people, or 31.6 per cent of the 
world‘s urban population, lived in slums.  The majority of them were in the developing regions, 
accounting for 43 per cent of the urban population, in contrast to 6 per cent in more developed 
regions‖ (UN-HABITAT, 2003).  While a startlingly large number of residents currently live in 
appalling conditions, the situation is not projected to improve.  The same report projects that in 
the next 30 years, the global number of slum-dwellers will more than double to 2 billion in 
population (UN-HABITAT, 2003). 
These trends strongly indicate that planners and social scientists of the future must be 
prepared to effectively interact with informal development.  This report seeks to provide 
theoretical research to expand the knowledge base of planners and social scientists with respect 
to informal development.  It aims to begin to explore and explain how informal development and 
living conditions interact, and to understand what the role of the planner and social scientist 
should be in interfacing with informal development in the future.  Through case study this report 
considers two distinct typologies of informal settlements in order to compare and contrast factors 
in each settlement‘s history and development, living conditions, and overarching administrative 
relationships.  Kibera in Nairobi, and Sultanbeyli just outside Istanbul, showcase key similarities 
and differences that provide insight into what conditions drive and proliferate informal 
development, as well as what factors shape how living conditions manifest within a community.  
In particular, this case study highlights the role rapid urbanization, in stressing formal framework 
capacities, plays in informal development.  In addition, this report discusses how relationships 
with overarching administrative entities, land tenure security, and settlement context affect living 
conditions, both positively and negatively, in informally developing conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
The concepts of informality, and all processes and settlements so-labeled, are nebulous in 
nature.  As with many social problems, the definitions of informality, informal settlements, and 
informal development are often inadequate and vary across disciplines.  It is therefore of 
paramount importance for any study examining these concepts to provide adequate research and 
literature review of both these and the related auxiliary concepts pertaining to informal 
development in order to develop appropriate operational definitions.  Within the context of this 
investigation into informal development and informal settlements, this literature review provides 
the necessary base of knowledge to effectively explore informal development, informal 
settlements, and the role planners and social scientists play when interacting with these global 
phenomena. 
Informality, Informal Settlements, and Slums  
 
The branding of things as informal is an undeniably Western phenomena that essentially 
sprang from the work of Keith Hart in the early 1970's.  Hart's research in Nima, a settlement 
outside of Accra, Ghana, focused on economic activity.  While reviewing official census figures, 
Hart discovered that over half of the total economically active population identified themselves 
as self-employed, non-wage earning, or unemployed (Hart, 1973).  Hart believed that this trend 
indicated a need to examine the economic activity occurring outside the formally recognized 
framework, eventually leading to his discussion of the previously unnamed ―informal economy.‖  
Thus, exploring informality as a concept is borne of a simple desire to define activities or 
phenomena that are not accounted for in formal systems or definitions.  In practice, this often 
results in the development of ―catch-all classes,‖ a means for categorizing all social phenomena 
that administrators, politicians and academics fail to account for in models and systems (Nustad, 
2004).  In light of this practice, many social scientists question the usefulness of the 
informal/formal dichotomy in many situations.  As applied to settlements in this report, however, 
this dichotomy is invaluable.  It provides a framework for identifying and linking essentially 
unique communities across the globe, providing context for case study.  
Defining the term ―informal settlement‖ is a difficult process.  In some places, like South 
Africa, it is official terminology that refers to specific situations: ―Houses (often of a temporary 
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nature) erected on land of which the majority have not formally been proclaimed and serviced 
for residential use‖ (South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 1999).  
Other definitions provide more general characterizations such as informal settlements are 
―residential buildings built on ‗planned‘ and ‗unplanned‘ areas which do not have formal 
planning approval […] characterized mostly by the low quality houses and the lack of, or 
inadequate infrastructure and social services‖ (Ali & Sulaiman, 2006).  Others indicate that 
informal settlements are so named because they are not legally recognized by national or local 
authorities (Bassett, 2001).  The United Nations, often considered the authority on issues in 
global development, defines informal settlements as a settlement with no legal claim to the land 
it is on, or a settlement that is unplanned or not in compliance with the regulations of the land on 
which it is located (2006).  In practice, this plethora of definitions shows that what ―informal 
settlements‖ refers to, is a product of operational definition.  The key issue discussed by all of 
these definitions, however, is a reference to some kind of abberration, or deviance from what is 
supposed to be occurring on the site in question.  As such, this report operationally defines 
informal settlements as any settlement that has no legal claim to the land it is on, or is not in 
compliance with the regulations of the land it occupies. 
It is important to recognize, however, that this operational definition of informal 
settlements necessitates further clarification.  Because of its maleable nature,there is a tendency 
for many people to equate informal settlements with ―slums,‖ ―shantytowns,‖ or other references 
to marginalized settlements.  This equation is incorrect.  The term ―slum‖ evolved from its 
historic definition as a term synonymous with ―racket‖ or ―criminal activity‖ to its common 
usage today that refers to a generalized settlement typology sometime during the 20
th
 century.  
As interpreted by Mike Davis in Planet of Slums, slums are characterized by ―overcrowding, 
poor or informal housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecurity of 
tenure‖ (2006).  In most United Nations‘ publications, slums are defined as settlements or areas 
lacking at least one of four basic amenities—clean water, improved sanitation, durable housing, 
and adequate living space (UN-HABITAT; The World Bank, 2005).  While there is overlap 
between the many definitions of slums and informal settlements, the terminology is not 
interchangeable.  The common thread at the heart of all the definitions of informal settlements is 
a reference to some kind of abberration, or deviance from what is supposed to be occurring on 
the site in question.  In contrast, the numerous slum definitions essentially attempt to define or 
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characterize the quality of a given settlement.  Though the concepts of formality and quality are 
intimately related, they refer to independent aspects of a settlement.  In short, not all informal 
settlements are slums, and not all slums are informal settlements.  Rather, informal settlements 
exist along a continuum of quality that encompasses a wide range of settlements.  The quality of 
these settlements is judged according to living conditions. 
 
Living Conditions 
 
The continuum of quality of informal settlements is predicated on a judgment of living 
conditions.  Most discussions of living conditions focus on single dimensions, such as 
infrastructure vs. land tenure, resulting in significant debate regarding which dimension used to 
measure living conditions held more weight (Gulyani & Basset, 2008).  For example, early slum 
upgrading from the World Bank focused on infrastructure upgrades and made no effort to 
address land tenure (Werlin, 1999).  The results of these one dimensional efforts proved that 
living conditions are a complex amalgamation of factors.  Moreover, identifying the factors, and 
the relationship between them, is difficult.  Yet the purposes of this report it is vitally important 
to be able to diagram and quantify living conditions.  UN-HABITAT indicates that acceptable 
urban conditions are characterized by access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, 
sufficient living area (not overcrowded), structural quality/durability, and security of tenure 
(―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  In practice this characterization of acceptable urban conditions 
indicates that living conditions are determinants of acess to improved water and sanitation, 
secure land tenure and a healthy built environment. It does not, however, provide any indication 
as to the importance of any given factor within this equation, leaving it open to interpretation and 
debate.  Gulyani & Bassett‘s living conditions diamond, however, posits that living conditions 
are determined by the interactions of four equally important factors:  infrastructure, land tenure, 
the housing unit, and the neighborhood unit (2008).  Encompassing the UN-HABITAT‘s criteria 
for acceptable urban living conditions, Gulyani & Bassett‘s living conditions diamond serves as 
the basic metric through which living conditions are judged within this report and is shown in 
Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1: The Living Conditions Diamond 
 
Infrastructure 
 
According to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), infrastrucutre is clasified 
within four categories:  water and environment, transportation, public facilites, and energy 
(2009). Within the context of settlements, however, these classifications are cumbersome.  Water 
and environment for example, is an extremely broad category that encompasses two very 
distincly different and important infrastructure aspects of a settlement.  In light of these 
incongrencies, this report considers the ASCE insfrastructure categories as they relate to 
settlements according to two basic categories, services and physical infrastructure, which are 
discussed in varying levels of detail.  The physical infrastructure section of this report deals with 
discussions of the built environment, such as roads and public facilities.  These aspects of 
infrastructure are also among the most visible dimensions of a community, particularly when 
lacking, and brief observations on the availability and state of these infrastructural elements 
provides this report with additional indications of settlement quality. The discussion of services 
within this report focuses specifically on access to water and sanitation with some discussion of 
non-essential services such as electricity, internet access, and television.  Literature regarding the 
services aspect of infrastructure is comparatively large, and covered with more emphasis than 
physical infrastructure within this report. 
Services are discussed in the literature and within this report according to access.  UN-
HABITAT‘s acceptable urban conditions state that a household is considered to have access to 
improved drinking water if it has a ―sufficient amount of water (20 liters/person/day) for family 
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use, at an affordable price (less than 10% of the total household income), available to household 
members without being subject to extreme effort (less than one hour a day for the minimum 
sufficient quantity), especially to women and children‖ (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  In 
addition to these conditions,  this report considers the characteristics of acceptable improved 
water access modes , which are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of Acceptable Improved Water Access 
 Water Access Mode  
Piped connection to house or plot 
Public stand pipe serving no more 
than 5 households 
Bore hole
1
 
Protected dug well
2
 
Protected spring
3
 
Rain water collection 
 
Improved sanitation, like water, is discussed in terms of access.  According to UN-
HABITAT, acceptable access to improved sanitation is characterized by ―an excreta disposal 
system, either in the form of a private toilet or a public toilet shared with a reasonable number of 
people‖ (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  As with water, characteristics of acceptable modes of 
access to improved sanitation are considered and shown in Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Refers to any hole bored into the ground, but in this case, for the purpose of extracting 
fresh water. 
2
 Refers to a dug well that is protected from contaminants via a cover, lined walls, etc. 
3
 Refers to a structure that dams an existing water source and elevates the water access 
point for sanitary reasons. 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of Acceptable Improved Sanitation Access 
Waste Disposal Mode 
Direct connection to public sewer 
Direct connection to septic tank 
Pour flush latrine
4
 
Ventilated improved pit latrine
5
 
 
Additional services (gas, electricity, cable, Internet) are not considered essential for 
acceptable urban conditions, but are still highly intertwined in informal settlements.  The 
presence, availability, and prevalence of any one of these non-essential services can be a 
potential indicator of a particular settlement‘s living conditions.  When present and relevant, 
these services are discussed in the case study. 
 
Land Tenure 
 
In this report, land tenure simply refers to a system of land ownership.  A fairly simple 
concept within the context of American property law, land tenure is among the most complicated 
issues in global development.  Land tenure and the system supporting it is very much a product 
of the history and culture of a settlement, and there are many unique schemes of ownership in 
practice throughout the globe (Fisher, 1996).  The variations of these systems aside, this report is 
concerned with a specific aspect of land tenure—security.  Secure tenure is defined as ―the right 
of all individuals and groups to effective protection by the State against arbitrary unlawful 
evictions‖ (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  This definition, however, is inadequate.  Tenure 
security, at its core, is simply a measure of confidence.  If a resident feels confident that they can 
                                               
4
 A pour-flush latrine is composed of a pan with a water-seal installed in a superstructure. 
The water-seal is connected to a pit by a pipe. The water-seal flushes out excreta with just 
enough water to drain off the solids and to restore the water level in the water-seal. 
5
 Refers to a simple latrine with a ventilation pipe above the super structure to vent odors 
above the structure. 
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inhabit a parcel of land without being killed, injured or harassed, that resident‘s tenure is secure.  
In practice, tenure security can manifest itself in many ways.  This security can be the product of 
formal documentation, but this security can also come from informal de facto means such as 
prolonged occupancy, or even a reinforced perception of tenure securirty (―Slums of the World,‖ 
2003).  This report focuses on characterizing and gauging tenure security for comparison across 
case study instances in order to judge how this security affects living conditions within Kibera 
and Sultanbeyli. 
Housing Unit 
 
A large range of structures is likely to compose the housing units of informal settlements.  
Housing units are judged according to durability and/or structural quality.  In general, a ―house is 
considered ‗durable‘ if it is built on a non-hazardous location and has a structure permanent and 
adequate enough to protect its inhabitants from the extremes of climactic conditions such as rain, 
heat, cold and humidity‖  (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  It is important to note that this concept 
is relative to location, as summarized by the UN-HABITAT‘s Slums of the World: The Face of 
Urban Poverty in the New Millennium:  
 
―Durability of housing will manifest itself in various ways in different cities.  For 
example, in Nairobi a non-durable house may be made of a patchwork of tin, 
cardboard, plastic sheets; while in Moscow it could be a dilapidated 
condominium‖ (2003). 
 
In this report, the judgments of durability of housing units are based on observations derived 
from the accounts of the housing units in literature.  Similar to water and sanitation access, UN-
HABITAT provides a list of factors for judging durability, which are listed in Table 2.3.  Yet this 
framework is designed to evaluate a single house, and many of the criteria listed in Table 2.3 
cannot be usefully applied to a general characterization of the housing units of a settlement.   It is 
clear, however, that the purpose of these criteria is to evaluate a structure‘s permanency, physical 
state, and environmental security.  Therefore, Table 2.4 below uses the criteria of Table 2.3 to 
create a more general framework through which this report evaluates the characteristics of the 
average housing unit of a settlement. 
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of Durable Housing Units 
Structure Characteristic 
Permanency of Structure 
Permanent building material for the walls, 
roof, and floor 
Compliance of building codes 
The dwelling is not in a dilapidated state 
The dwelling is no in need of major repair 
Location of house (hazardous) 
The dwelling is not located on or near toxic 
waste 
The dwelling is not located in a flood plain 
The dwelling is not located on a steep slope 
The dwelling is not located in a dangerous 
right of way 
 
 
Table 2.4: Adapted Characteristics of Durable Housing Units 
Structure Type Permanency Physical State 
Environmental 
Security 
    
 
Neighborhood Unit 
 
The quality of a neighborhood unit is an extremely difficult concept to quantify.  So 
much of a neighborhood‘s quality is contained in the ephemeral idea of community—
neighborliness, social unity and cohesion, sense of belonging.  Judging these concepts is largely 
superficial without a designed survey or experiment within the community specifically aimed at 
understanding the social capital of a neighborhood.  Moving forward however, there are some 
tangible qualities of the neighborhood unit one can discuss.  Is the area overcrowded?  Is there 
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open space in the neighborhood?  What is the condition of the public space?  In general, what is 
the health of the community?  What is the visual character of the neighborhood?  Is there a 
significant amount of solid waste exposed?  Intrinsically intertwined with observations about 
physical infrastructure, many aspects of the neighborhood unit, within this report, are discussed 
only briefly and in accordance with how these specific factors affect living conditions. 
One aspect of the neighborhood unit that this report can discuss slightly more in depth, 
however, is overcrowding.  UN-HABITAT provides some quantifiable numbers to judge 
overcrowding and outlines what is considered acceptable, sufficient living area at the dwelling 
unit scale:  ―A dwelling unit is considered to provide a sufficient living area for the household 
members if there are fewer than three people per habitable room‖ (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  
A habitable room is considered to be a minimum of four square meters (―Slums of the World,‖ 
2003).  Overcrowding is typically discussed at the household/dwelling unit scale because that is 
where the effects are felt most acutely.  This type of measure, however, is incongruent with the 
data available for Kibera and Sultanbeyli because housing counts and population censuses are 
typically innacurate.  This presesnts a significant challenge to determining if a community is 
―overcrowded,‖ as many scholars feel that overcrowding cannot be quantified through 
population density or intensity.  Rather than attempt to provide an arbitrary number for what 
―overcrowded‖ is, this report simply provides a comparative analysis of the population densities 
in Kibera and Sultanbeyli.   
 
Concluding Comments 
 
 The validity and successfulness of this study is intrinsically tied to a valid and successful 
base of knowledge of the key concepts associated with informal development.  In accounting this 
literature review, this report provides a window into the information uncovered that feeds the 
logic behind all of the important operational definitions and explanations of key concepts 
discussed throughout the remainder of the study.  In particular, this chapters discussion of the 
concept of informality‘s origin in Keith Hart‘s work provides important context as to why some 
settlements are labeled as informal.  Furthermore, outlining and distinguishing informal 
settlements and slums is an important concept moving forward with any discussion of different 
settlement typologies and varying living conditions within informal settlements. Through 
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providing operational definition of these concepts, through providing quantifiable metrics with 
which to gauge associated concepts such as the living conditions diamond, this literature review 
serves an extremely important function of generating and fostering shared understanding of the 
concepts explored and the subsequent findings within this study. 
 
  
  13 
CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
Introduction to the Research 
 
This study intends to provide insight into the growth and proliferation of informal 
development.  It seeks to diagram the conditions that lead to informal development as well as the 
associated forces and factors working to shape living conditions within this development.  
According to these goals, this report utilizes a case study of two distinctly different informal 
settlements, Kibera and Sultanbeyli, to identify the key differences and similarities in the 
development of the settlements and how this development manifests, as judged by living 
conditions.  However, indicating that a case study is the appropriate study type for this report is 
inadequate.  Rather, it is important to enumerate a research strategy and methodology to provide 
insight into the research process and in doing so, outline the credibility of the research contained 
within the report.   
As summarized by Catherine Hakim in Research Design: Successful designs for social 
and economic research, research is only fruitful when studies chosen for a study, project, or 
research program are appropriate to the questions needing addressed (2000).  Accordingly, this 
chapter serves many functions.  It provides discussion of the philosophical assumptions and 
rationales in this report‘s research.  It provides discussion of the motivations behind the research 
of this report, and the system of inquiry used to guide this research.  In addition to these ―high-
level‖ discussions, this chapter defines the research process used in this report.  It builds a 
general framework for the structure of this report‘s research design and explains the data sources, 
resource practices, and takes into account the unique challenges of investigating informal 
settlements and informal development.  In this way this chapter provides insight into the 
motivations behind, as well as the research process itself, in order to prove that the research 
contained within this report, is in fact fruitful and appropriately conducted. 
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Defining Research and the Research Process 
 
How one defines research within the context of the report heavily influences the research 
design and methodology of a report.  Among the most important initial questions one must 
consider is the aims of his or her research.  In social science disciplines there are two major 
research classifications that are distinguished according to these aims, theoretical research and 
policy research.  Theoretical research is concerned with causal processes and explanations, 
abstract variables and theoretical constructs—it is about developing knowledge for better 
understanding of a given subject (Hakim, 2000).  Conversely, policy research is focused on 
actionable factors and developing knowledge for action (Hakim, 2000).  While these distinctions 
are more of a generalized framework and there is plenty of overlap between theoretical and 
policy research, it is important to note that this report is principally concerned with theoretical 
research, or research that intends to provide a better understanding of informal settlements and 
informal development. 
Additionally, there are differing schools of thought concerning how to envision the 
research process, conceptually.  The first, and arguably most prevalent, conceptualization of 
research is that of excavation:  the researcher is digging, excavating ―dirt‖ in an attempt to 
uncover information or a conclusion.  Another common analogy for envisioning research is that 
of painting on canvas:  the researcher is using his or her research to create or produce some kind 
of conclusion.  This report, however, submits that there is in fact a third conceptualization of the 
research process that more accurately portrays exploratory research.  A more accurate 
conceptualization of exploratory research projects is an analogy to exploring uncharted territory.  
A researcher begins with a definite goal in mind, and a tentative plan for achieving that goal, 
much like an explorer readying his or herself for a trip.  In both cases, neither the researcher nor 
the explorer is certain what the journey holds or what path he or she must take.  Just as changes 
in terrain and circumstance dictate an explorer‘s trek, the information uncovered in an 
exploratory research process guides the focuses and direction of further research toward an 
ultimate goal.  The research process of this report is conceptually akin to this exploration 
analogy.  Theoretical in nature, the goal of the research of this report is developing a better 
understanding of informal settlements and informal development, but the focuses and direction 
of this research remained a very dynamic concept during the research process.   
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Research Design 
 
As summarized above, the key to successful research design hinges on marrying the goals 
of research with the available information and appropriate study type.  Gauging the 
appropriateness of a research strategy begins by weighing the key features, strengths, and 
limitations of study types with respect to the research one intends to conduct.  Given the 
theoretical, and exploratory nature of investigating informal settlements and informal 
development, this report utilizes case study.  Case studies are flexible and multipurpose (Hakim, 
2000).  They allow for a number of different systems of inquiry and differing levels of 
intellectual rigor—case studies at minimum provide informative, detailed descriptions of an 
event or social phenomenon, but can also form the basis of much more rigorous empirical studies 
(Hakim, 2000).  For this reason, case study is often the appropriate research study type when 
holistic, in-depth investigation into understanding and diagramming complex social phenomena, 
such as informal settlements and informal development, is necessary (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 
1991; Yin, 2003).  In addition to flexibility, case study is an ideal system of inquiry for this 
report because of a strong emphasis on contextual relationships and alternative sources of 
evidence.  As defined by Robert Yin in Case Study Research: Design and methods, case study is 
an investigation into contemporary phenomenon within real-life context when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Furthermore, as a system of 
inquiry, the case study copes with the unique situation in which variables of interest play a 
significantly larger role than data points, and as such, relies on triangulated multiple sources of 
evidence (2003).  The case study‘s focus on context and variables of interest allows this report to 
credibly examine the complex and intertwined relationships of a number of factors within 
specific informal settlements through accounts and periodical review, rather than other study 
types that rely on quantifiable empirical data.  While there are weaknesses in all types of 
research, case study is prone to bias, selectivity, and reflexivity (Tellis, 1997).  Case study 
overcomes these weaknesses, however, through the use of triangulation.  Denzin identifies four 
types of triangulation:  data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and 
methodological triangulation (1984).  While achieved through different means, all triangulation 
strategies attempt to counteract the inherent human error in case study by corroborating 
conclusions in data, different investigators, or replicable procedures (Denzin, 1984).  This report, 
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through the use of Robert Yin‘s defined case study protocol, uses methodological triangulation.  
The generalized process is as follows: 
 
1. Design the case study protocol: 
a. Determine the required skills 
b. Develop and review the protocol 
2. Conduct the case study: 
a. Prepare for data collection 
b. Conduct literature/periodical review 
3. Analyze case study evidence 
4. Develop conclusions, recommendations, and implications based on the evidence 
Case Study Protocol 
Overview  
 
Robert Yin identifies three specific types of case study in Case Study Research: Design 
and methods—exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive (2003).  These case study types are not 
mutually exclusive, but have different goals in mind.  For example, exploratory case studies are 
often considered preludes to social research.  Exploratory case studies often constitute the efforts 
to understand social phenomena that provide the platform for further research.  Explanatory case 
studies, however, focus on causal investigations, or attempts to understand why certain social 
phenomena occur (Yin, 2003).  This report has a hybrid approach in case study design, utilizing 
both exploratory and explanatory case study to investigate informal settlements and informal 
development.  Beginning with a general knowledge and concern about urbanizing trends and 
how this urbanization affects communities and the built environment in the developing world, 
initial research associated with this report focused on slums, equating poor living conditions with 
informal settlements.  After thorough investigation into slum upgrading, it became readily 
apparent that distinctly different community typologies exist within the umbrella term, ―informal 
settlements.‖  Furthermore, though the body of literature for slum upgrading is extensive, causal 
investigations into the processes at work that affects living conditions in a settlement remains 
largely unexplored and inconclusive.  This revelation indicates that case study of informal 
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settlements can provide significant insight into the processes shaping global informal 
development to planners and social scientists.  Furthermore, enhanced knowledge of these 
processes will better equip planners and social scientists to develop and refine strategies for 
addressing and working with the forecasted growth in informal development.  This report utilizes 
a multiple instance case study of two informal settlements: Kibera, a settlement within Nairobi, 
and Sultanbeyli, a settlement just outside Istanbul.  Each case study outlines the unique historical 
origins of each community and provides a characterization of the living conditions within the 
settlement today.  This case study identifies key similarities and differences in the settlements in 
order to provide insight into the growth and proliferation of informal development, as well as the 
associated forces and factors working to shape living conditions within this development.  
Through identifying these similarities and differences, this case study will provide initial 
indications of how informal development originates, and what factors determine living 
conditions within unregulated, informal development.  Furthermore, examining the origins of 
informal development and the determinates of living conditions allows this report to make initial 
suggestions as to how planners and social scientists can proactively address new informal 
development growth, as well as diagram how planners and social scientists can effectively 
intervene in informal development in order to combat slum living conditions. 
Research Procedures 
 
The research procedures involved in developing this case study are specifically designed 
to maximize access to quality information and minimize the impact of the challenges faced in 
investigating informal settlements and informal development remotely.  In light of geographic 
limitations, the bulk of the research produced through this case study is derived from literature 
and periodical review.  Through the use of scholarly journals, and local periodicals, this report 
compiles a large amount of information about each case study instance for careful vetting.  This 
information serves to provide historical context and characterizations of living conditions in both 
case study instances, which is then compared and contrasted for initial findings.  Where literature 
review is lacking, additional sources are used, most notably invaluable insight from Kelsey 
Smith, a Kalamazoo University student who spent six months studying abroad and working in 
the Kibera decanting site.    
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Case Study Questions 
 
The research conducted in this case study is guided by a substantial list of questions.  
Initial literature review for understanding informal settlements began with the following list of 
questions: 
1) Is all informal development the same? 
a. How does development differ/manifest? 
2) What are informal settlements? 
a. What do they denote? 
b. What are their unifying features? 
c. Are they a typology? 
3) What is a slum? 
4) What is the relationship between slums and informal settlements? 
5) How does one define living conditions? 
a. How do you gauge individual aspects of living conditions? 
Establishing this knowledge, discussed in the previous literature review section, allows for much 
more pointed inquiry with respect to this case study.  If informal development is forecasted to 
increase significantly in the next generation, how prepared are planners and social scientists to 
address the challenges associated with them?  Can planners and social scientists explain why 
living conditions vary across informal settlements?  How can planners and social scientists 
intervene in informal development to combat slum living conditions?  In synthesizing these 
questions, this report attempts to answer:  what conditions contribute to the growth of informal 
settlements, what is the relationship between informal development and living conditions, and 
what implications does this have for planners and social scientists? 
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CHAPTER 4 - Kibera 
 “One glimpse is enough. You have discovered the famous misery of the Third 
World.  A sea of homes made from earth and sticks rising from primeval mud-
puddle streets.  Massive numbers of people live here: somewhere between 
500,000 and a million souls.  Many have lived here for decades, but half the 
residents are under the age of 16.  All, old and young, new arrivals and long-term 
residents, live without running water, sewers, sanitation, or toilet” (Neuwirth, 
2006). 
 
Figure 4.1: Kibera 
(Kibera Street, 2009) 
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Kibera is a roughly 250 hectares (4km
2
) settlement seven kilometers southwest of 
Nairobi.  Kibera is made up of 10 official villages, each with a village Elder (see Figure 4.2).  
Conservative estimates state that Kibera houses approximately one third of Nairobi‘s population, 
800,000 peoples, at an estimated population density of about 2,000 persons per hectare (UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006).  Kibera is informal—the land it 
occupies is government owned and the majority of the population rents from landlords who have 
permission from the local chieftain to build temporary mud and corrugated steel huts.  At any 
point, however, the Government of Kenya can evict the residents of Kibera and reclaim the 
land—it is the quintessential squatter community and slum.  The conditions in Kibera may 
represent the most accurate embodiment of slum living conditions as described by the United 
Nations (2006).   
History 
 
One must consider the larger contexts when reviewing the history of Kibera—the history 
of Nairobi, Kenya, and Africa are equally important in developing an accurate historical context 
for the informal settlement.  This is a bold statement, because in saying so, this report risks 
calling the scope of its own research into question.  Such a broad historical inquiry encompasses 
a number of key research fields and foci that, within this report, go fairly unexplored.  For 
example, this research is not intended to discuss post-colonial or sub-altern theory in depth, and 
as such, avoids digressing into deep detail.  It is important, however, to recognize that colonial 
occupation played a key role in shaping Africa socially, politically, and economically.   
Similarly, without delving deeply into rural-urban migration theory, it is important to 
note that cities have historically attracted a large influx of populations.  The Harris-Todaro 
Model, largely considered the authority on rural-urban migration despite recent criticism, 
provides the most widely accepted theoretical framework for examining rural-urban migration 
(Riadh, 1998).  There are very specific aspects of this framework that scholars question, but one 
key assumption has been confirmed by expanded investigation and applied studies:  relative 
wages and the perceived probability of finding a job have historically been important 
determinants of a decision to move (Riadh, 1998).  In short, cities as perceived by the masses, 
have historically appeared to have more jobs and higher wages than rural areas, which in turns 
  21 
motivates relocation.  Yet, applying rural-urban migration models to Nairobi, as with many 
African cities, is difficult.  Nairobi began life under British control.  More to the point, ―Nairobi 
didn‘t exist before the British came.  It was a small Masai settlement at a confluence of several 
small rivers‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  Nairobi was meant to be the staging point for the British 
ambition of establishing a rail system across East Africa, beginning in 1899 (Neuwirth, 2006).  
This railroad construction and the resulting labor need it generated combined with traditional 
rural-urban migration processes inspired many rural Africans to relocate to Nairobi in search of 
better paying work and higher standards of living.   
Under British control, however, Africans coming into Nairobi were tightly regulated and 
segregated:  those Africans that had permission to come to the capital as laborers were housed in 
temporary, single room barracks and could not bring their families (Neuwirth, 2006).  The many 
that came without permission were left to fend for themselves—they began building large thatch 
hut neighborhoods outside the city limits (Neuwirth, 2006).  The British Colonial Authority 
treated the thatch hut neighborhoods with ambivalence—some were tolerated, others were 
forcibly dismantled (though they often reappeared).  These unique conditions laid the 
foundations for informal settlements in Nairobi that have since been cemented into the cultural 
landscape despite their inherently temporary nature.  This point is no better illustrated than by the 
fact that informal settlements in Nairobi continued to burgeon following Kenya‘s independence 
in 1964 (Neuwirth, 2006). 
But the story of Kibera is even more complex.  The land Kibera occupies was initially 
classified as unused bush outside the city limits of Nairobi (Parsons 1997; Neuwirth 2006).  This 
land was granted to the armed forces by the King of England for use as a firing range in 1904, 
and one of the units that was trained there was the King‘s African Rifles, commonly referred to 
as the KAR (Parsons 1997; Neuwirth 2006).  As this army corps of predominantly Sudanese 
Africans aged, they petitioned for, and were granted permission via military occupancy permits, 
to settle on the outskirts of the training area—291 retirees were granted this right in 1912 
(Parsons 1997, Neuwirth 2006).  These retirees remained behind after the KAR were redeployed 
and held the land in customary tenure
11
 until 1933 when they were declared Tenants of the 
                                               
11
 Refers to land which is owned by indigenous communities and administered in 
accordance with their customs. 
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Crown (The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006).  Under this new land administration 
system, the structure of Kibera as a community began to shift.  As Nairobi continued to develop 
as a city, Kibera‘s close proximity to the city center and industrial areas made the settlement very 
attractive to those immigrating to Nairobi for work.  Consequently, by the time the Nubian 
residents were allocated 500 acres in northwest Kibera in 1950, they were already leasing land to 
people from other tribes seeking housing after immigrating (The Centre on Housing Rights & 
Evictions, 2006).  During this time Kibera remained predominantly Nubian, though the ethnic 
composition was shifting.  Bernard Nzau, Kibera Resident, characterized the area during this 
time period as rural, and clean.  He indicated that people took joy in tribal differences (Neuwirth, 
2006).  These conditions however, changed dramatically beginning in 1969.  In 1969, Tom 
Mboya, an influential Luo
12
 cabinet member was assassinated.  Fearing persecution and 
violence, many Luos fled the conflict and settled in Kibera which was perceived safe compared 
to neighboring communities (The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006).  Almost 
overnight, Kibera ballooned to a settlement with a gigantic population and a distinct ethnic 
divide between the Nubian ―landlord‖ minority, and the new ethnic majority of Luo and other 
tribes.  Without formal planning, government recognition and representation, adequate services, 
and secure tenure, the Kibera settlement quickly grew beyond the carrying capacity of the land.  
The majority of the settlement‘s population now lives in appalling conditions and violent 
conflicts between Nubians and non-Nubians erupt often in land and political disputes (Tension 
Runs High Over Nairobi Eviction Threat, 2009). 
 The living conditions of Kibera today have garnered a lot of attention from outside 
parties over the last three decades.  As a result, Kibera‘s recent history is inundated with a 
number of slum-upgrading ventures of mixed result.  The most recent and comprehensive 
undertaking, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP), uses Kibera‘s Soweto 
neighborhood as a pilot project (UN-HABITAT, 2000).  This nationwide project is a ―key core 
poverty Programme aimed at addressing the challenge of housing problems affecting the 
majority of the urban population who live in slums and informal settlements‖ (Ministry of 
Housing, 2010).  It is a robust project with phased implementation, scheduled for completion in 
2020 in accordance with the United Nation‘s Millennium Development Goals to address slums 
                                               
12
 Luo is the third largest ethnic group within Kenya behind the Kikuyu and Luhya.  
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globally.  With respect to Kibera‘s unique situation, the KENSUP program created a decanting 
area for relocating families (in phases) as sections of the existing settlement are upgraded.  The 
decanting area is composed of a 17 block, five-story high collection of 600 three-room units 
(Ministry of Housing, 2010).  In late 2009, the first major relocation of Kibera residents into the 
decanting area took place (Kenyan premier leads Nairobi slum dwellers in relocation exercise, 
2009). 
 
Figure 4.2: Villages of Kibera
13
 
(Maps of Kibera, n.d.) 
 
 
Living Conditions 
 
Before delving into the living conditions of Kibera, a caveat: the KENSUP activity in 
Kibera, most of which occurrring after the publication of Robert Neuwirth‘s Shadow Cities, 
creates an interesting conundrum.  With the implementation of this phased upgrading plan, two 
                                               
13
 Figure 4.2 is a map of Kibera‘s villages generated by the Carolina for Kibera 
foundation, a 501(c) (3) affiliated with the University of North Carolina and the Center 
for Global Initiatives.  While a low quality image, this is the only map of Kibera‘s 
villages available as of this report‘s composition. 
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different Kibera‘s emerge, but data regarding the progress of KENSUP in Kibera is fleeting.  
This duality has significance in considering Kibera‘s living conditions, but it is difficult to gauge 
the reach and impact of this significance.  Without formal research on KENSUP‘s reach and 
impact on Kibera‘s population, estimations are integral to understanding the scope of the 
KENSUP project‘s progress.  Research indicates that 1,800 families relocated to the Kibera 
decanting site in the initial wave (1,800 Kibera Families to Move to Modern Houses, 2009).  
Considering the average family size in Kibera of 7 persons, a generous estimation is that the 
KENSUP plan to date has relocated 12,600 persons to the decanting site.  Based on the 
observation of Kelsey Smith, a University of Kalamazoo student who spent 6 months studying 
abroad and researching in Kibera, there are an estimated 2,000 people living in the decanting site 
as of February 2010 (Smith, 2010).  Using these two estimations, KENSUP has relocated 
anywhere between 0.25% - 1.5% of Kibera‘s population to date14.  As such, the direct effect of 
KENSUP as it pertains to the entirety of Kibera‘s population is quite narrow.  Furthermore, 
according to Kelsey Smith‘s observations in Kibera, as of February 2010, upgrading to the 
relocated familiies‘ neighborhood, projected to take three years, had not yet begun(Smith, 2010).  
Other local sources also provide information to suggest the pace of the project is an issue, stating 
that at the current pace it will take 1,178 years to complete (Inter Press Service, 2009).  
Accordingly, this report concludes that the general characterization of Kibera‘s living conditions 
is not significantly altered by the KENSUP progress to date, but maintains that it must be 
carefully monitored for future implications. 
Infrastructure 
Services 
 
Access to information regarding informal settlements, is difficult to characterize.  Often 
times, there is not much information available, and when it is; the information is far from 
reliable.  Kibera, on the other hand, is a fairly well studied informal settlement.  Robert Neuwirth 
                                               
14
 Estimated site population (2000) / Kibera‘s estimated population (800,000) x 100 = 
0.25%.  Families relocated (1,800) x Average Family size (7) / Kibera‘s estimated 
population (800,000) x 100 = 1.5%. 
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chose Kibera as his African example of ―squatters,‖ in his book Shadow Cities (2006).  The 
University of North Carolina established Carolina for Kibera (see Figure 4.2 and footnote 16) in 
2001, a nongovernmental organization that combats ―abject poverty and helps prevent violence 
through community-based development in the Kibera slum of Nairobi, Kenya and beyond‖ 
(University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2001).  Perhaps even more impressive, Scottish 
filmmaker Jamie Doran helped establish an offshoot of the world-renowned Celtic Football Club 
in Kibera with philanthropic aims within Kibera: 
 
―Since its threadbare beginnings, the club has received new strips, boots, shin pads and 
goalkeeping gloves thanks to Jim Mullins, from the salmon supplier Lighthouse 
Caledonia, who sent the equipment after being told about the club.  With the proceeds 
from the matches played so far, Ouma and Njira [club founders] have started a chicken 
farm, with all profits diverted to the needy‖ (Grahame, 2009). 
 
In the face of this global visibility, the challenge in gathering information about Kibera without 
firsthand observation is to carefully consider and vet the information available to determine 
which pieces of information provide the most accurate picture of Kibera.  This is a delicate 
process as the majority of information regarding Kibera comes from observations made by 
external individuals that may or may not be motivated by specific agendas.  These agendas may 
or may not have bearing on the accuracy on these individuals‘ observations and the conclusions 
drawn.  Charles Onyango-Obbo of Kenya‘s The Nation summarizes this phenomenon best.  
There are two basic views adopted by non-slum dwellers who visit Nairobi‘s slums:  the 
―romantic who is in love with the ‗creative drive‘ of the slums surrounding Nairobi,‖ and the 
―cynic and hardened urbanite who thinks it is patronizing to feel pity‖ for the residents (2009).  
Though Onyango-Obbo‘s endorsement of the oft-discussed ―slums as a transitional 
phenomenon‖ argument where people use slums as a necessary stepping-stone to middle-class 
security and comfort indicates a modicum of inherent cynical bias, Onyango-Obbo‘s 
characterization of how non-slum dwellers perceive and react to slums is still helpful in 
discovering and weighing ulterior motivations in publications.  While a number of sources were 
consulted, this section‘s understanding of the infrastructure and services in Kibera is based on 
observations made in Shadow Cities (Neuwirth 2006), assorted publications by the United 
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Nations, the Water and Sanitation Programme, and local press releases and articles.  Considering 
the accecptable urban living conditions criteria discussed in Chapter 2 in conjunction with the 
observations of the listed publications, this report develops a generalized idea of the living 
conditions within Kibera and further, initial judgments of said living conditions.   
Though the details vary by account, in general discussion, the infrastructure of Kibera is 
almost universally maligned.  Accordingly, the indication is that most acceptable urban 
conditions are not met: the built environment, while functional, is far from aesthetically pleasing, 
public facilities are few and far between and access to basic, essential services is appalling 
(Alder 1995; Kiplagat, 2009; Michela 2008; United Nations 2009).  Delving deeper, a number of 
comments pulled from the literature provide key insights about Kibera‘s infrastructure.  Firstly, 
in reference to access to water services: 
  
1) ―Although water mains exist all around Kibera, the government has never extended 
water service into the mud hut city" (Neuwirth 2006). 
 
This passage of Robert Neuwirth‘s Shadow Cities highlights a harsh reality in Kibera.  For 
whatever reason, economic, social, or political, the government had not, as of 2006, extended 
water service into Kibera though the infrastructure to do so existed.  It is important to note the 
distinction between water service and water availability.  What Robert Neuwirth is referring to 
when he says ―water service,‖ is a formal, dwelling-by-dwelling, end-user relationship between 
Kibera residents and the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company—a relationship with direct, 
metered connections to individual houses or plots.  While the statement seems to indicate 
otherwise, there is municipal water piped to Kibera.  In actuality, there are approximately 25 
kilometers of piped network in Kibera, though much of that network gets little or no water 
(Brocklehurst, 2005).  This erratic service is an over-arching issue for Nairobi, as well:  ―Only 
about 187,000 or 42 percent of the total households in Nairobi have legal water connections. 
Nearly all others, largely poor households, obtain water from kiosks, water delivery services and 
illegal connections‖ (Brocklehurst, 2005).  A 2002 report on the state of Nairobi‘s water services 
goes on to indicate that ―of those that are presently served by the utility, 40 percent do not 
receive a 24-hour supply. Some 30 percent receive water once in two days while 10 percent 
receive water only once a week. Unaccounted-for-water is over 50 percent of the total volume of 
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treated water produced‖ (PPIAF, 2002).  In Kibera, this overarching shortage is intensified by 
the limited capacity of the pumping station on the main line that feeds Kibera, and the tendency 
to divert water to high-income areas where revenue collection is greater and the political 
influence is higher (Brocklehurst, 2005).  Ultimately, it is clear that for the majority of Kibera‘s 
800,000 residents, a direct piped water connection to the house or plot is not possible.  In point 
of fact: 
 
2)  ―4% of residents [in Kibera] have-in house water connections, 15% rely on yard taps 
and 68% rely on water kiosks managed by private individuals, NGO‘s or CBO‘s‖ 
(Umande Trust, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Hakijamii Trust, 2007). 
 
The kiosk system is the main mode of access to water services in Kibera.  Estimates from the 
Water and Sanitation Program state that 40% of the water supplied to Kibera is lost through 
leakage, and 50% is sold at kiosks (Brocklehurst, 2005).  As the main mode of access to water, 
and considering the high visibility of access to basic services in determining a settlement‘s 
quality, the kiosk system in Kibera has garnered a significant amount of attention from the 
international community over the last two decades.  In practice, the water kiosks of Kibera are 
the embodiment of a demand responsive approach to community water supply where the users of 
the service are the initiators, planners, implementers, managers, and owners of the service (The 
World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, 1997).  In this capacity water kiosks have served an 
extremely important function within Kibera in the absence of widespread direct, piped 
connections to individual homes or plots.  Unfortunately, the kiosk system is largely 
entrepreneurial and unregulated.  A 2005 World Bank Water and Sanitation Program Field Note 
identified 650 water kiosks in operation in Kibera—private entrepreneurs run 98% of these 
kiosks while Community Based Organizations (CBO‘s) and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO‘s) run the remaining 2% (Brocklehurst, 2005).  This lack of regulation leads to a number 
of issues in cost, cleanliness, and equity in Kibera‘s water supply system.  A key component of 
the UN-HABITAT‘s acceptable urban conditions with respect to water access is that the 
minimum sufficient quantity of water, 20/liters/person/day, is available to household members 
without being subject to extreme effort (less than one hour a day), especially to women and 
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children (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  Several passages from the literature shed light on this 
aspect of water access in Kibera: 
 
3) ―Depending on where you live, the kiosk may be right outside your door or as much 
as a kilometer away‖ (Neuwirth, 2006). 
 
4) ―Carrying water, by and large, is women‘s work … Even the young are put to the 
task.  I have seen little girls who are barely taller than the 2-foot-high jerry cans 
dragging them home after buying water‖ (Neuwirth, 2006). 
 
Determining if a household is subjected to extreme effort in accessing water is best observed on 
a case-by-case basis.  These passages, however, provide valuable insight on the average 
household‘s effort in accessing water through kiosks in Kibera.  Firstly, the amount of effort a 
household must expend in traveling to the kiosk varies, and in many cases the distance is 
extreme.  One 2007 report compiled by residents of Kibera suggests that Neuwirth‘s 
characterization may be extreme, stating that the average distance from household to the nearest 
water kiosk is 40 meters (The Right to Water and Sanitation in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, 2007).  
However, considering that a large number of Kibera‘s water kiosks‘ connections to the water 
mains are established and facilitated through bribing local authorities, equitable placement is far 
from guaranteed (Neuwirth, 2006).  Similarly, it is important to recognize the unspoken potential 
issues in this statement. Water may or may not be available at the nearest kiosk.  In fact, the 
World Bank‘s Water and Sanitation Program identified that the average poor household in 
Kenya spends 45 minutes per day collecting water (Brocklehurst, 2005).  Those with private 
connections spend 5 minutes daily, those with yard taps spend 15 minutes daily, and users who 
rely on kiosks spend upwards of 55 minutes daily collecting water (Brocklehurst, 2005).  In 
addition, it is clear that the burden of collecting water for the household falls to the women and 
children of the household—the two vulnerable demographic groups singled out by the UN-
HABITAT‘s acceptable urban conditions.  Furthermore, through these observations, this report 
determines that with respect to necessary effort and primary laborers, the current system for 
collecting water in Kibera does not meet the acceptable urban conditions as outlined by UN-
HABITAT (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003). 
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UN-HABITAT‘s acceptable urban conditions also discuss issues of cost in water access, 
stating that a household must have access to the minimum sufficient amount of water for less 
than 10% of the total household income (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  The average price of 
each jerry can varies by conditions and supply—on average each jerry can is between Ksh2 and 
Ksh3 (Brocklehurst, 2005).  Given that the average household in Kibera makes an estimated 
Ksh45 per day, the average household size is 7, and the minimum sufficient amount of water is 
20 liters/person/day (or one jerry can per person), the average household would require at least 7 
jerry cans of water for no more than Ksh4.5 in order to meet this criteria.  These raises important 
questions—is water too expensive, or are wages in Kibera abnormally low?  The simple answer 
is both.  While low household incomes exacerbate affordable water accessibility, research 
indicates that Kibera‘s water kiosks often cost the residents significantly more than the tariff‘s 
associated with a direct connection from the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company.  At Ksh2 
per jerry can, roughly Ksh100 per m3, Kibera‘s residents pay eight times the lowest block of 
tariffs for a domestic connection and four times the average tariff in Kenya (Brocklehurst, 2005).  
Yet this is only the beginning of the cost issues associated with Kibera‘s water kiosks: 
 
5) ―During water shortages, the prices become even higher, soaring to Ksh5 or even as 
much as Ksh10 for a 20-liter jerry can (the equivalent of Ksh500 or US$6.60 per m3).  
The unit cost of water in Kibera can thus rise above the average price of water at 
private connections in European countries‖ (Brocklehurst, 2005). 
 
The rates used by Kibera‘s water kiosks, driven by market factors, continually fluctuate, and 
directly impact the average Kiberan household‘s ability to access water.  Unregulated, preference 
is shown to those willing to pay at a premium for water during a shortage.  Neuwirth even notes 
that further amenity is available to those willing to pay for it:  ―When water is scarce—a 
common occurrence in Nairobi, where even rich neighborhoods sometimes go weeks without 
any water—long lines form, and the price goes up.  And when lines are really long, there‘s a two 
tiered system: people who want water without waiting can get it with express service—if they 
pay for it‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  Ultimately, in regards to affordability, Kibera‘s water access is far 
from the acceptable urban conditions outlined by UN-HABITAT (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003). 
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In addition to these issues limiting access to water service in Kibera, water quality is a 
serious concern.  Theoretically, though passing through a third party, Kibera receives treated 
water from the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company that is potable.  In its journey from the 
main lines of Nairobi‘s water network to the end-user in Kibera, issues arise: 
 
6) ―Kiosk operators lay pipes along existing channels including open sewers full of solid 
waste and contaminated water.  This allows contamination of water during its 
transportation from the utility network to the kiosk.  Many use low quality plastic 
pipes to reduce costs, as metal pipes are much more expensive and could be stolen.  
Plastic pipes have the added advantage of being flexible enough to follow the 
winding and irregular paths found in most of Kibera.  ‖ (Brocklehurst, 2005). 
 
Unfortunately, theft of pipes and infrastructure elements is not uncommon in Kibera.  One major 
concerted effort in early 2004 by the World Bank and Nairobi City Council fell disappointingly 
short of its goal to pipe municipal water into Kibera in part because of this tendency by Kibera‘s 
residents.  The plan went to contract and a large number of pipes were installed within Kibera, 
but infighting erupted between the contractors and the City Council and the project was mired in 
inactivity.  The project was ultimately doomed when some of the residents dug up the inactive 
pipes and sold them for scrap (Neuwirth, 2006).  Opting for cheaper plastic pipes in running 
water to their kiosks, Kibera‘s kiosk operators lower their overhead investment and minimize 
their economic risk, but compromise the quality of their product (see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Informal Water Pipe Network Kibera 
(Water Source Burst Pipe, n.d.)
 
 
 In 2003, the World Bank‘s Water and Sanitation Program began an effort to regularize 
the water kiosk system in Kibera.  They held regular meetings with kiosk owners and worked 
diligently to build the capacity of the kiosk owners, helping to band them together, increase self-
regulation, and craft strong collective bargaining needs to take to the Nairobi Water and 
Sewerage Company (Brocklehurst, 2005).  Through this collective effort, the kiosk owners and 
the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company have made strides in regularizing illegal connections 
and improving the distribution network to the kiosks (Brocklehurst, 2005).  In addition, pilot 
projects of similar aims from NGO‘s like the Kenya Water for Health Organisation exist 
throughout the settlement.  These efforts, however, are a slow moving process.  As of 2010, there 
is not any documented evidence to suggest that any significant change to the overall state of 
water access within Kibera has occurred.  As water kiosks serve more than 5 households, only 
19% of the population enjoys an acceptable water access mode through piped connections to the 
house or yard taps (public stand serving no more than 5 households).  Thus, the typical water 
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access mode in a general characterization of Kibera, water kiosks, does not mirror the 
characteristics of an acceptable water access. 
As with water services, access to sanitation is an overarching issue in Nairobi: 
―According to the United Nations World Water Development Report, 2006, 65 per cent of 
people living in Kenya's urban areas have no access to basic sanitation, while 40 per cent of rural 
dwellers go without sanitation facilities‖ (Bongi, 2005).  Given that the Nairobi City Council 
does not provide sanitation services to Kibera, dealing with wastes in Kibera is a conundrum of 
epic proportions (Bongi, 2005).  This small geographic area, stressed by a large population, 
inadequate water services, and virtually no physical infrastructure struggles daily, at all scales, to 
manage human, solid, and water waste.  This struggle is no more visible than in the average 
Kiberan‘s day-to-day effort to manage his or her biological waste. 
The World Bank‘s Water and Sanitation Programme‘s Understanding Small Scale 
Providers of Sanitation Services: A Case Study of Kibera (2005) details an in-depth study into 
the sanitation services available in Kibera with a specific focus on biological waste.  This report 
outlines the six models of latrines identified in Kibera, public and private, according to a number 
of factors—these models are summarized in Table 4.1.  The 493 latrines identified in Kibera 
have differing compositions, sources of funding, fee structures, and quality (2005).  From these 
findings, valuable conclusions about the state of toilet and latrine facilities emerge.  Firstly, of 
the 493 latrines identified in Kibera, The Water and Sanitation Programme classified 78% of the 
public latrines as ―poor,‖ and 22% as ―good.‖  Comparatively, the same report classified 83% of 
private latrines as ―fair,‖ 17% good, and noted that there are an unquantifiable number of very 
poor private latrines as well.  In terms of the overall state of Kibera‘s latrines, public and private, 
22% are ―poor,‖ 60% are ―fair,‖ 18% are good, and there are a number of unquantifiable, very 
poor latrines.  An overwhelming number of these latrines (roughly 98%) are externally funded 
through CBO‘s, NGO‘s, and development agencies.  The report suggests a number of reasons for 
why so many of the latrines are externally funded and managed, the most likely being the lack of 
incentive for private investment in the face of insecure tenure (Bongi, 2005). Ultimately, these 
statistics derived from The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s findings indicate that, of the 
latrine facilities available, most (78%) are in good-to-fair condition.  How this translates to the 
residents of Kibera in terms of availability and accessibility, however, is another matter.  
Estimates on latrine and toilet facilities as applied to the population of Kibera vary: 
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1) ―Kibera‘s 800,000 residents must share 600 toilets, meaning that on average one toilet 
serves 1,300 people‖ (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006). 
 
2) ―One latrine is often used by several households or even several plots (a ‗plot‘ refers to a 
group of rooms either belonging to the same owner or placed side by side), which means 
up to 150 may be sharing a single latrine‖ (Bongi, 2005). 
 
3) ―There is one pit latrine for every fifty to five hundred people‖ (Mercy & Elizabeth, 
Sanitation and Hygiene in Kibera Slums, Nairobi, 2008). 
 
 
In actuality, it is likely that each of these estimations of the number of toilets or latrines to 
people holds merit considering the general vagueness of the definition of ―latrine15‖ and scarcity 
of reliable data regarding Kibera.  Regardless, according to UN-HABITAT, acceptable access to 
improved sanitation is characterized by ―an excreta disposal system, either in the form of a 
private toilet or a public toilet shared with a reasonable number of people‖ (―Slums of the 
World,‖ 2003).  Quotes 1, 2, and 3 all show a large disparity in the number of available facilities 
for Kibera‘s extreme population, well beyond what is considered acceptable urban conditions.  
This disparity also leads to maintenance issues that may further reduce the number of accessible 
latrines in Kibera.  As Table 4.1 shows, nearly all the latrines in Kibera are pit latrines—
reference the ―Excreta Disposal Method‖ and ―Technology‖ columns—that require emptying 
every ten months on average (Bongi, 2005).  Sludge removal is a key activity in pit latrine 
maintenance as full latrines are unusable and risk overflowing, particularly in the rainy season 
(Bongi, 2005).  In the absence of municipal sanitation services, latrine emptying relies on small-
scale providers of sanitation services.  Figure 4.4, based on data from Understanding Small Scale 
                                               
15
 Most definitions of ―latrine‖ indicate that it may refer to a group of facilities, such as a 
toilet block, as well as an individual unit.  There was no operational definition provided 
in The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s report so it is unclear which, if not both, type  
of latrine this report refers to. 
   
3
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Table 4.1: Latrine Models in Kibera
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Model 
Owner 
of 
Facility 
Public 
or 
Private 
Investment 
Funding 
Sources 
Management 
Mode 
Number 
of 
Latrines 
Excreta 
Disposal 
Method 
Technology 
Price (in US$) Services and 
Maintenance  
Quality 
Per 
Use 
Per 
Month 
1 CBO Public Grant Volunteer 105 
Pit or bio-
digester 
toilets 
Pit latrines or 
pour flush 
0.025 to 
0.064 
1.3 Poor 
2 CBO Public Grant Employee 24 
Pit or bio-
digester 
toilets 
Pit latrines 0.025 - Good 
3 
Private 
Operator 
Public 
Private / 
Micro 
finance 
Employee 6 
Sewer 
Connection 
Pour flush 
toilets 
0.038 - Good 
4 CBO Private Grant 
CBO members 
and users 
298 Pit Pit latrines - 2.6 to 5.2 Fair 
5 Owner Private 
Owner and 
grant 
Owner 60 Pit Pit latrines - - Good 
6 Owner Private Owner Owner N/A Pit Pit latrines - - Very Poor 
                                               
16
 Recreated from The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s Understanding Small Scale Providers of Sanitation Services: A 
Case Study of Kibera (2005). 
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Providers of Sanitation: A Case Study of Kibera, shows the options for dealing with full pit 
latrines in Kibera and the percentage of how often each is chosen.  While small-scale providers 
of sanitation services play a vital role in emptying many of these latrines, as Figure 4.4 shows, on 
average roughly 13% of Kibera‘s latrines remain ―out of order.‖ 
In addition to the limited number of latrines available in Kibera, the Water and Sanitation 
Programme identified several key secondary factors that limit widespread accessibility to 
improved sanitation.  Given that the majority of latrines in Kibera are externally funded, it is 
particularly telling that the majority of these latrines are clustered in the villages of Kianda, Laini 
Saba, and Makina while the remaining villages have few to no externally funded latrines (see 
Table 4.2).  The Water and Sanitation Programme document that reports these findings suggests 
that this is largely due to poor coordination between the agencies involved and ease of access for 
construction crews (Bongi, 2005).  Regardless of the underlying conditions that led to the 
inefficient latrine locations, for many residents this presents a large physical barrier to improved 
sanitation access.  It is also probable that latrine usage in Kibera is not financially viable for a 
large proportion of Kibera‘s residents.  As Table 4.1 shows, nearly all of the latrines‘ operational 
funding comes from levying a fee on users, either monthly or per use; some of these fees are 
static, others fluctuate.  In the harsh economic environment of Kibera, many residents cannot 
justify paying a fee for the privilege of a latrine. 
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Table 4.2: Externally Funded Latrines by Village
17
 
Village Population 
% of total 
population 
Total Externally 
Funded Latrines 
Gatwikira 52,234 11.1 1 
Kianda 71,366 15.3 136 
Kisumu Ndogo 48,340 10.3 34 
Laini Saba 27,340 5.9 156 
Lindi 57.715 12.3 30 
Makina 95,636 20.5 96 
Mashimoni 23,437 5.0 0 
Siranga 53,850 11.5 30 
Soweto 37,949 8.1 4 
 
Figure 4.4: Methods for Dealing with Full Latrines in Kibera
18
 
 
                                               
17
 Recreated from The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s Understanding Small Scale 
Providers of Sanitation Services: A Case Study of Kibera (2005). 
18
 Recreated from The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s Understanding Small Scale 
Providers of Sanitation Services: A Case Study of Kibera (2005). 
33%
28%
13%
3%
5%
13%
5%
Mechanical Emptying
Manual Emptying
Gravitational Emptying
Chemical Emptying
Pit Relocation
Out of Order
Unknown
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Ultimately, the number, location, and costs (both in maintenance and usage) of latrines in 
Kibera prevent many residents from feasibly accessing them.  In response, the residents resort to 
alternative methods for dealing with biological waste.  Consider the account of Kennedy, 24-
year-old student volunteer and Kibera resident:   
 
4) ―We don‘t have proper toilets here.  Some good Samaritans and NGO‘s have put in toilet 
facilities of sorts, but it is very difficult.  People just go on the roadside or riverside‖ (UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006). 
 
Of course life in Kibera doesn‘t always allow people to use this direct of a method for relieving 
oneself.  In response to what conditions allow, Kibera residents developed the infamous ―flying 
toilet.‖  Described as the one thing that is ―making a mockery of sanitation,‖ there is no delicate 
way to discuss flying toilets (Water and Sanitaiton Trust Fund, 2009).  It is a common 
occurrence for Kibera‘s residents to relieve themselves in polyurethane bags and fling them as 
far away as possible from their huts afterward—hence the moniker.  These practices are clearly 
appalling and far from ideal for many of Kibera‘s residents.  Yet an individual‘s attempt to 
manage his or her biological waste in Kibera is an intensely personal struggle that often 
necessitates these appalling methods.  The irony of these alternative methods is that though they 
represent Kibera‘s residents‘ best attempts to create a sanitary environment for themselves and 
their families, when scaled up to the entire population of Kibera over hundreds of thousands of 
iterations, they become key contributors to a vast collective sanitation nightmare—a true tragedy 
of the commons.  
 Based on the data available through The Water and Sanitation Programme‘s latrine 
research, of the identified latrines the majority are pit latrines (Bongi, 2005).  Furthermore, it is 
logical to assume that externally funded latrines classified as ―fair,‖ or ―good‖ are ventilated 
improved pit latrines.  However, it is clear that many of Kibera‘s residents, for many reasons, do 
not have access to these latrines on a regular basis.  Thus, though options for access to improved 
sanitation in Kibera do exist, these options do not represent the typical mode of sanitation used 
by the majority of Kibera‘s population. 
 There are non-essential services that exist in Kibera.  However, the majority of the 
electrical connections that exist in Kibera are illegal and unreliable.  A brief review of 
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periodicals shows that as recently as August of 2010 the Nairobi power company was working to 
disconnect illegal connections in Kibera, and this was met with violent resistance from the 
residents (Kibera News Network, 2010).  In addition, many residents utilize wet cell batteries to 
power their homes, recharging them at stations within the settlement (Neuwirth, 2006).  
Whatever the source, even fleeting access to electricity allows for a number of amenities that 
Kibera‘s residents can utilize such as video halls (movie theaters).  Perhaps the most interesting 
development in Kibera, however, is internet access.  The vast majority of Kibera‘s residents do 
in fact have access the worldwide web—through mobile phones (The Associated Press, 2009).  
However, many of these residents rely on third parties to charge, and repair these phones.  Thus, 
while the non-essential services available in Kibera provide for expanded amenity and self-
awareness, indications are that access is limited, typically cumbersome, and has little impact on 
living conditions within Kibera. 
Physical Infrastructure 
 
 The state of Kibera‘s physical infrastructure has been discussed in previous sections of 
this chapter—the water and sewer network is inadequate and failing, there is no comprehensive 
plan for waste removal from the area and the roads are narrow, irregular and often impassable for 
vehicles.  This is summarized nicely in Understanding Small Scale Providers of Sanitation 
Services:  ―Most roads in Kibera are inaccessible to vehicles, drainage channels on the sides of 
roads are often blocked, pit latrines overflow (especially in the rainy season) and heaps of 
uncollected garbage are everywhere‖ (Bongi, 2005).  These problems are often intertwined—
inaccessible roads prevent trucks for waste removal, refuse clogs existing sewer/drainage 
channels, and blocked sewer drainage channels overflow and flood further compromising the 
physical infrastructure of Kibera. 
 It is difficult to discuss the public facilities of Kibera because of Kibera‘s unique 
ownership situation.  Without land ownership and accurate land-use maps and classifications, 
there is not an accurate inventory of these public facilities as of yet.  The best effort thus far is 
the Map Kibera initiative, whose database indicates that there are 211 health facilities in and 
around Kibera, and 228 education facilities in and around Kibera.  According to the 
classifications of the education system in Kibera, there are 115 nurseries, 17 kindergartens, 57 
primary schools, 19 secondary schools, and 32 Trade/other schools, shown in Table 4.3.  While 
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this data does not provide any judgments of the physical quality of the educational facilities in 
Kibera, it does show that the facilities are present within the community.  Additionally, these 
numbers seem to indicate that the nature of education within Kibera is a much more intimate, 
small-scale process in Kibera. 
 The Map Kibera initiative also provides a list of health facilities within Kibera.  The basic 
classifications of these facilities are chemists, clinics, and health centers.  Unlike the information 
available for the education facilities, there are additional layers of information in the health 
facilities data—ownership and operational status.  There are three basic actors in health facilities: 
private owners, NGO owners, and CBO owners. The number of each type of facility as well as 
how many of the facilities are operational is shown by owner in Table 4.4.  This data indicates 
that the majority of health facilities available in Kibera are chemist, or pharmacists, followed by 
clinics.  Additionally, the majority of these facilities are privately owned.  However, this data 
shows that a higher percentage of the CBO and NGO owned facilities are operational compared 
to the privately owned facilities, calling into question the quality of the privately owned health 
facilities in Kibera.
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Table 4.3: Education Facilities in Kibera 
 
Education Facilities (228) 
Classification Count Percentage of Facilities 
Nursery 115 41 
Kindergarten 17 6 
Primary 57 20 
Secondary 19 7 
Trade/Other 32 11 
 
Table 4.4: Health Facilities in Kibera 
 
Total 
Facility Count Operational Count % 
Chemist 102 73 72 
Clinic 78 64 82 
Health Center 8 8 100 
NGO Owned 
Chemist 3 2 67 
Clinic 8 8 100 
Health Center 3 3 100 
Private Owned 
Chemist 80 70 88 
Clinic 51 50 98 
Health Center 4 4 100 
CBO Owned 
Chemist 0 0 0 
Clinic 3 3 100 
Health Center 1 1 100 
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Land Tenure 
 
Land tenure in Kibera is enigmatic.  While the settlement has existed for nearly a century, 
very few of Kibera‘s residents are structure owners, and none of them are landowners.  The 
concept of ownership in Kibera is complicated, and many sources indicate that a large portion of 
Kibera‘s population does not recognize they do not formally own the land they occupy (The 
Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006).  This largely stems from a widely-held belief that 
prolonged occupancy equates to ownership in Kenya.  In fact, the Kenyan constitution does 
provide for this type of ownership through adverse possession.  If the long-term occupiers can 
prove that they have used the land continuously for 12 years they are legally entiteld to claim 
adverse possession and take ownership of the land (The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 
2006).  Unfortunately, claiming adverse possession is not a realistic option for many residents 
because it is generally difficult to prove, the Kenyan Government can claim that the State is 
holding land in trust for the general public, and the process hinges on a motion being brought in 
court, which is costly (The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006).  Ultimately, the land 
Kibera occupies is classified as ―forest‖ and remains government owned, though the Nubian 
residents make legitimate ancestral claims to the land allocated to their forefathers with the 
Kings African Rifles (Tension Runs High Over Nairobi Eviction Threat, 2009; Inter Press 
Service, 2009; The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006). 
Interestingly, the situation in Kibera highlights some unique bureaucractic issues.  Land, 
particularly the access and control of it, figures prominently Kenya‘s history.  Events such as the 
Mau Mau Uprising highlight the importance of land ownership and tenure security to Kenyans.  
In light of this history, it follows that in modern Kenyan culture, ―[t]he granting of land is a 
primary mechanism for structuring society and gaining political power and allegiance‖ (Bassett, 
2001).  How this translates to Kenya‘s informal settlements is in access and use.  The key actor 
in accessing and using land in Kenya‘s informal settlements is the Provincial Administration, a 
holdover from British colonial occupation.  Initially a mechanism for African civil service in the 
British colony, the Provincial Administration is composed of local elders and chieftains of 
Kenyan neighborhoods, employed by the State, that shoulder some of the administrative 
responsibility (Neuwirth, 2006).  In many aspects of Nairobi, which is both a Province and a 
City, the Provincial Administration is very much a ―do-nothing‖ bureaucracy as all of the 
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provision, delivery, and maintanence of services and infrastructure is the responsibility of the the 
Nairobi City Council (Neuwirth, 2006).  Yet there is one particularly important administrative 
duty the Provincial Administration performs; it controls the access and use of government land 
courteousy of temporary occupancy permits (Neuwirth, 2006).  Therefore, the Provincial 
Administration has the final say in determining who can build in Kibera, when and where they 
can build, and when the structures have to come down.  Not surprisingly, this system is ripe for 
corruption given the unique conditions of Kibera.  During his time in Kibera and Nairobi, Robert 
Neuwirth notes that many of the residents stated that the local chiefs and elders took bribes for 
permission to build and make any improvements to a structure.  When he confronted these chiefs 
and elders, they denied taking bribes but conceded that it could be happening in other areas 
(Neuwirth, 2006).  In effect, the Provincial Administration dictates development in Kibera.  It 
makes the final decision in who gets to build, where they get to build, and how they get to build.  
Above all, they reserve the right to revoke these temporary occupancy permits at any time.  In 
this way, a structure owner‘s tenure security is, in many cases, dependant on the relationship he 
or she has with the local elder or chief from the Provincial Administration:  ―Structure owners 
have some security of tenure, depending on the arrangements they have made with the Provincial 
Administration and Councillors.  However, the recent eviction threats have demonstrated how 
precarious that tenure is‖ (The Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, 2006).   
The security of tenure for structure owners is only the beginning of the problem.  
Estimates vary, but on average, sources indicate that roughly 90% of Kibera‘s population is not a 
structure owner, but a tenant (Bongi, 2005; Neuwirth, 2006; The Centre on Housing Rights & 
Evictions, 2006).  Most of the structures in Kibera are absentee-owned because owning a mud-
hut is a good investment.  Nairobi residents often buy or build mud huts in Kibera because the 
overhead is low, and there is no legal recourse for not maintaining the structure or providing 
services—profit is virtually guaranteed after nine months (Neuwirth, 2006).  Additionally, it is 
likely that the number of more wealthy absentee owners hinges on their ability to pay the 
―auxilliary‖ costs associated with securing a temporary occupancy permit.  In terms of tenure 
security, this means that roughly 90% of Kibera‘s population has even less tenure security than 
structure owners.  In addition to the precarious legal nature of the structures in Kibera, tenants 
have virtually no protection from the demands and whims of Kibera‘s structure owners.  
Consider Neuwirth‘s account of Michael Owaga Obera, Kibera resident who works for the 
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Nairobi City Council:  ―When he arrived, the rent was 150 shillings a month.  At the time each 
house had its own latrine, and the commmunity was safe, even late at night.  By 1999, the rent on 
Michael‘s two rooms was 1,900 shillings.  Then Kenya‘s President Daniel arap Moi ordered 
landlords to reduce their rents.  In late 2002, he was paying 1,300 shillings, but the landlord was 
demanding 1,600 and had refused to accept the lower amount for three months.  Michael feared 
he could be evicted‖ (2006).  On top of issues with absentee ownership, clashes between ethnic 
groups still affect safety and tenure security to this day.  As recently as September of 2009, all 
non-Nubian residents of the Makini neighborhood in Kibera were threatened with eviction by the 
Nubian population:  ―Letters seen by Nation that was used to threatening [sic] members from 
other communities claimed to be signed by a Mr Sheik Mohamed called on all non-Nubians to 
move from the plot or else face unexplained consequences. ‗You must vacate this land by May 1 
or else you will face dire consequences‘‖(Tension Runs High Over Nairobi Eviction Threat, 
2009).  Raila Odinga, prime minister and parliamentary representative for the Lang‘ata area in 
which Kibera resides, has promised the Nubians title deeds to their land upon the initiation of the 
KENSUP plan, but as of late August 2010, this has not occurred (Mangat, 2010).  Ultimately, 
whether an ancestral resident, structure owner, or a tenant, it is clear that tenure security in 
Kibera is virtually non-existent.   
Housing Unit 
 
Kibera is composed of two basic types of housing unit—mud huts and corrugated steel 
huts.  In discussing the durability of these structures, it is obvious that permanent building 
materials and overall permanency of structure are not allowed in Kibera.  A key criteria of the 
temporary occupancy permits that allow the structures of Kibera is that the structures remain 
temporary.  As this snippet from Shadow Cities shows, the Provincial Administration is 
unyielding in this respect: ―I asked one chief to imagine that I was a local resident who wanted to 
take down my mud hut and build with concrete and brick.  ‗That is not permitted,‘ he told me.  I 
persisted.  What if I built it anyway? ‗I would knock it down,‘ he said‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  This 
process ensures that the structures in Kibera remain temporary, and removes any incentive for 
structure owners to make improvements.  Furthermore, given that there is no building code that 
governs the quality of structures within Kibera, many are dilapidated and in need of major repair.   
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Environmentally, Kibera‘s structures are often compromised.  Consider the account of 
Kibera resident Wambua:  when he first moved to Kibera, he lived in a hut next to the latrine.  
When the latrine wasn‘t emptied and the rainy season came, Wambua came home to find that the 
latrine had overflown into his hut.  After moving out of this hut, his next hut was on a hill so 
steep that the path to his house was three feet below his doorway (Neuwirth, 2006).  In Kibera, 
this environmental vulnerability is not uncommon.  The typical structure, both mud or corrugated 
steel, is often located near waste, within floodplains, and/or on unsafe slopes.  For example, over 
the late spring and early summer of 2010, Kibera sustained significant flood damage during 
heavy rains.  The team from Map Kibera, a non-profit that utilizes GPS and mobile phones to 
create an open source map of the area, worked to identify and report on the flooding.  According 
to their official blog, ―there were more than 50 houses severely damaged, displacing the 
inhabitants. One school was completely swept away. Walking calmly, I didn‘t even notice 
anything in particular, until Hasan suddenly pointed out that I was standing where only days ago 
a school had been. Not even the foundations were visible anymore‖ (Map Kibera, 2010).  
Therefore,  the characteristics of the average structure in Kibera are summarized in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Adapted Characteristics of Durable Housing Units in Kibera 
 
Structure 
Type 
Permanency Physical State 
Environmental 
Security 
Mud Hut Little to 
none. 
Provides climate 
protection, but is 
susceptible to 
environmental damage 
and often in disrepair. 
Not guaranteed.  
Often located on 
steep slopes, within 
floodplains and near 
waste. 
Corrugated 
Steel 
Little to 
none. 
Provides little to no 
climate protection and 
is often in disrepair. 
Not guaranteed.  
Often located on 
steep slopes, within 
floodplains and near 
waste. 
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Neighborhood Unit 
 
As the previous sections of this report have alluded to, the environmental quality of Kibera is 
poor.  There is, however, a strong sense of belonging, and community identification in Kibera 
and its villages.  This is showcased by the Nubian community‘s ancestral claim to the land, and 
the many accounts of Kibera residents who sing its praises despite the obvious issues, although it 
is tempered by social tensions.  Perhaps the largest contributing factor for this poor 
environmental quality and social tension is the sheer number of individuals located in Kibera.  
Population and structure counts vary, but it is estimated that on average, nearly 3.5 people 
occupy a 10m
2
 single-room structure throughout the settlement (UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006).  This estimate is just under the acceptable urban conditions laid 
out by UN-HABITAT, which states that there should be no more than three people per habitable 
room, 4m
2
 (―Slums of the World,‖ 2003).  While the average dwelling unit is not overcrowded 
according to these estimates, the 250-hectare (2.5km
2
) settlement struggles to accommodate the 
estimated 800,000-person population at 320,000 persons per km
2
.  This density is clearly visible 
in satellite imagery of the settlement shown in Figure 4.5.  This density has collateral effects on 
the physical health and visual quality of the neighborhood unit.  Open space is rare, and often 
tainted with exposed waste.  This leads to significant health concerns:  ―The spread of infections 
from one person to another are frequent because of the overcrowding and congestion situation in 
slums […] the most common communicable diseases in Kibera slums are cholera, malaria, and 
diarrhea‖ (Mercy & Elizabeth, 2008). Visually, Kibera is characterized by crowded makeshift 
structures and exposed waste and sewage.  This presents a very negative and polarizing image of 
the neighborhood unit in Kibera.   
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Figure 4.5: Aerial photograph of Kibera
19
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
This chapter discusses the history and living conditions of Kibera according to the 
conceptual framework laid out in this study‘s literature review.  This discussion shows that 
Kibera‘s residents have little or no access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation services.  
Additionally, the current land tenure system does not provide Kibera‘s residents with secure land 
tenure, the housing units are in poor condition, and the physical environment of the 
neighborhood unit is overcrowded and unsanitary.  In short, Kibera typifies slum living 
conditions.  The relationship Kibera‘s residents have and have historically had with the 
overarching administrative bodies is largely exploitative.  This relationship is rife with 
corruption and administrative oversight that plays a large role in determining living conditions in 
a settlement, particularly when compared to Sultanbeyli.
                                               
19
 Taken from google.com/maps at a scale of 1‖-200‘ 
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CHAPTER 5 - Sultanbeyli 
“In Sultanbeyli, nobody owns, but everybody builds.  Fatih Boulevard, the main 
drag, is 5 miles long and boasts a strip of four-, five-, and six-story buildings 
complete with stores, restaurants, banks and real estate brokerages” (Neuwirth, 
2006). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Locating Sultanbeyli 
(Sultanbeyli Istanbul Highlight, n.d.) 
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Sultanbeyli is one of the most interesting and enigmatic communities in the world.  A 
predominantly Muslim district on the Asian side of Istanbul (see Figure 5.1), Sultanbeyli boasts a 
population of roughly 300,000 people.  From humble roots, Sultanbeyli has grown to an 
undeniably attractive and active urban center.  The area boasts an impressive laundry list of 
amenities, all achieved without formal ownership: ―150 major avenues, 1,200 streets, 30,000 
houses, 15 neighborhoods, 300,000 people, 91 mosques, 22 schools, 48,000 students‖ (Neuwirth, 
2006).  Officially a district (ilçe)
20
 in the Istanbul province, Sultanbeyli controls its own destiny 
though a popularly elected mayor, a planning department, a department of public works, and a 
santitation department (Neuwirth, 2006).  As characterized in Shadow Cities and shown, the 
Sultanbeyli that exists today is a true downtown: 
 
―Over the years, central Sultanbeyli became a true downtown. Here, along Fatih 
Boulevard, is a line of impressive buildings housing impressive businesses: banks, 
travel agents, money exchange shops … jewelers, car dealers, Internet cafes, 
department stores, restaurants, and a post office‖ (Neuwirth, 2006). 
 
Although Turkey and Istanbul both boast ancient histories, the Sultanbeyli that exists today is 
largely the product of construction that occurred after the mid-1980‘s (Tugal, 2008).  The most 
obvious and general conclusion, is that rural-urban migration dictates the development and 
growth of informal settlements.  This positive correlation
21
 is clearly indicated in Sultanbeyli‘s 
development and was the conclucions that Noah Billig reached in Evaluation of Open Space 
Form and Use in an Istanbul Squatter Settlement (2009).  However, to say that rural-urban 
migration is the cause of Sultanbeyli‘s development and growth post 1980 is to ignore the 
complex and entangled processes at work in Turkey, Istanbul, and Sultanbeyli—to ignore the 
inherent wickedness of Sultanbeyli.  Rather, efforts must be made to understand the historical 
context of Sultanbeyli and the unique external and internal processes and factors working within 
Sultanbeyli contributing to its development and shaping its living conditions. 
                                               
20
 See Table 4.1 – Turkish Administrative Structure 
21
 Refers to the statistical definition of positive correlation meaning that as rural-urban 
migration increases so does the development and growth of Sultanbeyli. 
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Figure 5.2: Fatih Boulevard, Sultanbeyli 
(Sultanbeyli evden eve nakliyat, n.d.) 
 
History 
  
When discussing the history of Sultanbeyli, a brief overview of the history of Istanbul is 
necessary.  The term ―empire‖ is not used casually in the annals of history, and it should not be 
overlooked that Istanbul has figured prominently in the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman 
Empires.  As the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium—as it was known at the 
time—served as an important seaport and center of trade.  During a struggle for the throne in 191 
AD, the city was razed and consequently rebuilt on a larger scale by Roman Emperor Septimius 
Severus (Governorship of Istanbul, 2009).  In the 4
th
 century the Emperor Constantine, infamous 
as being the first Christian Emperor, declared the city his capital and renamed it to 
Constantinople (Governorship of Istanbul, 2009).  Following the split of the Roman Empire in 
395 AD, the Eastern Empire (known modernly as the Byzantine Empire) endured a significantly 
longer history than that of the Western Empire, which fell in the 5
th
 Century, including a period 
of civil war between families (726-842), Latin occupation following the Fourth Crusade (1204-
1261) until the city was finally conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 (Governorship of 
Istanbul, 2009).  The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet moved the capital of the Ottoman Empire to 
Constantinople, renamed the city Istanbul, and the city remained under Ottoman control until the 
   50 
First World War (Governorship of Istanbul, 2009).  During this period, though relatively war 
free, the city suffered frequent devastating fires that shaped the urban morphology of the area 
(Governorship of Istanbul, 2009).  Following the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk prevailed after a four year war of independence to form the first republic in Asia, 
exiling the Sultan and his family, adopting the Latin alphabet and outlawing the fez and veil 
(Governorship of Istanbul, 2009).  With the formation of the new Republic, the founders moved 
the capital from Istanbul to Ankara, and Istanbul was ―abandoned‖ (Tugal, 2008).  Ankara 
received the bulk of infrastructure investment, and although Istanbul remained the main trading 
center of Turkey, the population halved (Tugal, 2008).  What resulted, was a culturally diverse, 
economically active city with a significant population void that ripe for explosion—this 
explosion took the form of gecekondu. 
Far out on the Asian side of Istanbul, the Sultanbeyli of 1969 was described by former 
mayor Yahya Karakaya as a ―sleepy‖ rural settlement of two dozen families who raised cows, 
sold the milk to passing city-dwellers, and harvested lumber from the forest (Neuwirth, 2006).  
Sultanbeyli began as a gecekondu community—a simple squatter settlement.  The term 
gecekondu is a combination of the turkish words gece, meaning ―night,‖ and kondurmak, 
meaning ―to happen,‖ thus the word literally translates ―to happen at night‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  
Gecekondu communities originated as a result of conflicting Roman and Ottoman property laws.  
Essentially, gecekondu are settlements that took advantage of an archaic loophole in Turkish law: 
if an adequately habitable structure was in place when they arrived, authorities could not remove 
the residents or raze the structures without taking them to court (Neuwirth, 2006).  Thus, many 
original settlers seeking housing built quickly at night, occupying the land they desired.  Initial 
attempts to address the gecekondu in 1949, involved attempts to destroy the illegal dwellings—
the federal government passed a law requiring the belediye (municipalities) to destroy the 
gecekondu (Neuwirth, 2006).  However, the idea of alienating a large voting base within the 
belediye was ―politically unpalatable‖ and the government amended the law to allow the 
improvement of existing gecekondu and demolition of new gecekondu only (Neuwirth, 2006).  
The government passed a similar law in 1966 granting amnesty to existing gecekondu, and again 
in 1984 and 1990—this time allowing for redevelopment of the existing gecekondu areas 
(Neuwirth, 2006).   
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The development of Sutlanbeyli largely took place during the 1980‘s.  One of the most 
obvious engines in Sultanbeyli‘s, as with many informal settlements‘, development is rural-urban 
migration (Davis 2006; Fernandes 2008; Billig, 2009).  As the Turkish economy stagnated, there 
was a large shift of rural populations travelling to urban areas looking for work.  Of course, other 
factors facilitated the growth and development of Sultanbeyli as well.  Sultanbeyli also enjoyed 
easy access to land and a major highway passing through the middle of Sultanbeyli opened in the 
mid 1980‘s.  Not surprisingly, Sultanbeyli became a particularly desireable location for many 
people working in Istanbul and seeking housing because of these factors (Neuwirth 2006, Tugal 
2008).  But not all of the factors contributing to Sultanbeyli‘s rise are direct, politics played a 
major role in Sultanbeyli‘s growth.  There are some key political factors that help establish 
Sultanbeyli‘s historical context.  The first of these key factors the posturing between the 
secularist and Islamist populations of Istanbul.  Due to its rich cultural heritage, Istanbul has 
strong ties to both Islamic and secular systems of governance and the two sides often jockey for 
support among local communities.  In Sultanbeyli, this is a particularly interesting phenomenon: 
 
―In the early 1980‘s Sultanbeyli had been little more than a village on the edge of 
the forest, with a population of around 4,000 and no distinctive political or 
religious coloration.  The people living there were mainly Black Sea migrants, 
SHP
22
 supporters who co-existed peacefully enough with more religious 
residents…by 1989 Sultanbeyli had a population of 80,000 and an RP23 mayor‖ 
(Tugal, 2008). 
 
The scenario Tugal outlines indicates a fundamental shift in Sultanbeyli‘s community fabric with 
significant socio-political implications.  The RP leadership entrenched itself in the community 
offering easilly accessible land for new settlers, as well as help with food, clothing and 
construction materials.  Accordingly, Sultanbeyli was molded into what is characterized as a 
Muslim ―fortress,‖ with a population swelling to nearly 300,000 (Tugal, 2008).  Tugal‘s account 
of Sultanbeyli‘s development, however, does not mention how Sultanbeyli gained access to 
                                               
22
 The secular Social Democratic People‘s Party 
23
 The Islamist Welfare Party 
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formal political representation within Turkey‘s administrative structure.  The second key 
political factor in understanding Sultanbeyli‘s historical development is a brief discussion of 
access to formal political representation.  This representation is borne of another interesting 
aspect of Turkish law.  In Turkish law, communities with at least 2,000 residents can organize 
and apply to the federal government to register as either an ilçe (district), or belediye 
(municipality), granting the local community a modicum of control over planning and the ability 
to collect revenue for services (Neuwirth, 2006).  In short, communities have the right to 
organize and begin controlling their own destiny.  Sultanbeyli is currently an ilçe in the Istanbul 
province as a result of this application process and the organization of the community alluded to 
in Tugal‘s account of Sultanbeyli‘s political evolution.   
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Table 5.1: Turkish Administrative Structure 
Designation Equivalent Translation Description 
Bölge Regions 
Seven census-defined regions that have no 
administrative context—they are simply statistical. 
İller Provinces 
81 Provinces administered by an appointed governor 
(vali). 
İlçeler Districts 
Currently 957 districts in Turkey governed by the 
district central (ilçe merkezi
24
) of the province where 
the sub-governor (kaymakam), or head official of the 
district, resides.  
Merkez ilçe Central District 
One district of each province that is administered by 
an appointed vice governor of the province. 
Büyükşehir 
 
Metropolitan 
Municipality 
Some belediye are designated as metropolitan 
municipalities, or ―big cities,‖ and have some specific 
administrative duties with respect to the belediye 
contained within its boundaries. 
Belediye
25
 Municipality 
Municipalities with a mayor who governs a specific 
geographic area (belde).  
Koy & Mahalle Village & Quarter 
The two smallest administrative divisions with their 
own elected officials (muhtars) with specific 
administrative responsibilities. 
                                               
24
 Not to be confused with the merkez ilçe, which refers to the Central District of the 
province 
25
 There are two types of belediye because communities outside the belde have the right 
to apply to the federal government to become belediye or ilçe when they have at least 
2,000 residents.  These beliediye haven‘t yet become district centers (for any given 
reason) and as such have a mayor responsible for its municipal zone but not its own 
kaymakam (sub-governor).  It depends administratively on the district center of the 
district it is within. 
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Living Conditions 
Infrastructure 
Services 
  
  In the absence of firsthand observation, the discussion of these services in the literature 
is the source drawn upon for judgments made in this report.  In particular, the observations of 
Robert Neuwirth (2006 & 2007), Cihan Tugal (2008), and to some extent, the New York Times 
Article ―In Quake-Threatened Cities, Quick Growth Invites Disaster‖ (Revkin, 2010) form the 
basis of this observation.  In looking at the accecptable urban living conditions criteria discussed 
in Chapter 2 in conjunction with these observations, this report develops a generalized idea of the 
living conditions within Sultanbeyli and further, initial judgments of said living conditions. 
In general discussion, the infrastructure in Sultanbeyli is significantly better than that of 
the typical informal settlement:  most criteria of acceptable urban conditions are met; the built 
environment is both functional and aesthetically pleasing, as is the case with the public facilities 
(Neuwirth 2006 & 2007).  This is already a sharp divergence from the conditions exhibited in 
Kibera, however, a number of comments pulled from the literature provide an opportunity to 
draw more specific conclusions.  Firstly, in deference to water and sewer services: 
 
1) ―ISKI, the city‘s water authority26, has invested more than 143 trillion Turkish 
Lira (almost $90 million) to pipe in water to every home.  In 2002, two-thirds 
of the city‘s neighborhoods had water available to every house.  Streets in the 
remaining five neighborhoods were already being ripped open so the massive 
water mains could be installed‖ (Neuwirth, 2006). 
 
                                               
26
 In the administrative divisions of Turkey, some municipalities are under the 
administration of a larger metropolitan municipality (büyükşehir) as well as their own 
administration.  In this case, Sultanbeyli is also within the administration of metropolitan 
Istanbul.  This is expanded upon in Table 5.3. 
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There are several conclusions one can draw from this observation.  Firstly, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the construction discussed in Shadow Cities is completed at the time of this 
report‘s composition eight years later.  Barring natural disaster or human intervention (war, 
political dealings, sabotage, economic disinvestment, etc.), eight years is an adequate timeframe 
for finishing the construction and installation of Sultanbeyli‘s water mains.  Secondly, it is fair to 
assume that the majority of individual households in Sultanbeyli have a piped water connection 
to the house or plot (See Table 5.2).  It is important to recognize ―most‖ as a qualifier in the 
previous statement because there are undoubtedly households that remain without piped 
connections.  Indeed some issues are exposed in Neuwirth‘s further discussion of Sultanbeyli‘s 
water services:  a onetime fee of $160 and the installation of a meter cause many residents to 
balk at the idea of hooking up to municipal water services (2006 & 2007).  This apprehension is 
best illustrated by Neuwirth‘s description of Zamanhan Ablak in Shadow Cities (2006):   
 
―Ablak came to Sultanbeyli‘s Akşemsettin in 1995, before services were formally 
available through Sultanbeyli or Istanbul.  Instead, he and his neighbors 
contributed their own money and paid for their own services—sewers (200 
million Turkish lira), schools (310 million), and a mosque (65 million).  Now he 
and other Akşemsettin residents are taxed for the municipal services and still 
required to pay the hook-up fee for the water mains.  Though Ablak has indoor 
plumbing, he had up until the publishing of this book, refused to pay to hook up to 
the water main.‖ 
 
Ablak‘s apprehension to pay is not difficult to understand—in a community primarily 
built through self-help
27
, municipal fees and taxes represent a generally unnecessary 
investment.  Additionally, it is fair to assume that some of the population simply cannot 
afford the connection fees.  The result, with respect to the water access of Sultanbeyli, is 
the assumption that a modicum of the population has yet to pay for access to the water 
mains.  Yet interestingly, Ablak‘s story provides another dimension to the water access 
                                               
27
 ―Self-help‖ is the buzz term applied to everything that informal settlers or squatters do 
or themselves (i.e., self-help housing, self-help services, etc.) 
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profile of Sultanbeyli: if a citizen chooses not to hook up to water mains, this indicates 
that other reasonable water access modes exist within the settlement.  Furthermore, 
combining this with the literature‘s intimation that the majority of the community has 
embraced direct water connections, the condition of water access in Sultanbeyli is good. 
 
Table 5.2: Typical Acceptable Water Access in Sultanbeyli 
Water Access Mode 
Piped connection to house or plot 
Public stand pipe serving no more 
than 5 households 
Bore hole 
Protected dug well 
Protected spring 
Rain water collection 
 
With respect to sanitation, Quote 1 above pulled from Shadow Cities alludes to some 
interesting ideas as well.  In general, with piped water connections in home, indoor plumbing for 
the purposes of sanitation follows.  Yet, it is not expressly indicated in the literature that any 
mode of sanitation other than indoor plumbing with direct sewer connection occurs in 
Sultanbeyli.  Rather, commentary indicates that the majority of Sultanbeyli has access to public 
sewer.  The use of such services is dependent on embracing water connections, as illustrated yet 
again, by Zamanhan Ablak:  ―Although the home he built has full bathrooms and showers inside, 
his building still does not have water‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  Again, Ablak‘s choice to avoid 
connecting to the water mains seems to indicate that sufficient improved sanitation options exist 
in the community (public toilets, public buildings, etc.) that allow him to avoid paying the water 
connection fee. 
Another particularly poignant quote pulled from Shadow Cities that provides an 
indication of the access to improved sanitation in Sultanbeyli:  
 
2)  ―Today, Sultanbeyli is an independent squatter metropolis—population 300,000—and 
Yahya Karakya is its popularly elected Mayor.  From an oversized desk in a 
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cavernous office on the seventh floor of the massive squatter City Hall, he presides 
over an empire that includes everything you thought squatters could never achieve: a 
planning department, a department of public works, a sanitation department, even a 
municipal bus service‖ (Neuwirth, 2006). 
 
The existence of a planning, public works, and sanitation department within Sultanbeyli‘s 
administration is a key point.  Among other things, it shows that the capacity of the 
administration(s) overseeing Sultanbeyli is fairly high with respect to the global context—
someone locally empowered is planning and there are administrative tools to implement these 
plans.  Furthermore, with a dedicated sanitation department bolstered by municipal planning, a 
specific plan for collecting, transporting, and dealing with solid waste exists.  In light of this 
commentary, it is assumed that, as with access to water, the majority of the population in 
Sultanbeyli has access to direct connections to the public sewer (see Table 5.3).  Thus, the 
general characterization of access to improved sanitation in Sultanbeyli is good. 
 
Table 5.3: Typical Improved Sanitation Access in Sultanbeyli 
Waste Disposal Mode 
Direct connection to public sewer 
Direct connection to septic tank 
Pour flush latrine 
Ventilated improved pit latrine 
 
 The literature also indicates that many non-essential services are widely available in 
Sultanbeyli (electricity, gas, Internet), as well as a vibrant economic sector capable of serving a 
fairly high level of consumerism.  Consumerism is useful for characterizing a settlement when 
categorizing the goods and services exchanged within a settlement according to value.  The 
consumerism exhibited in Kibera, while impressive circumstantially, pales in comparison to the 
goods and services offered on Fatih Boulevard, which is ―lined with impressive buildings 
housing impressive businesses,‖ such as Internet cafes, jewelers, car dealers, and department 
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stores
28
 (Neuwirth, 2006).  Clearly the market value of goods exchanged in Sultanbeyli is far 
higher than the goods exchanged in Kibera, and this gap in the goods and services offered in the 
communities is an indicator of the gap between the settlements‘ levels of development.  Perhaps 
even more interesting, however, is the installing of gas pipes in Sultanbeyli.  In installing gas 
pipes, Sultanbeyli distinguishes itself from many formal areas of Istanbul as well, because ―in 
most neighborhoods of Istanbul, even many legal ones, people run their stoves on bottled gas‖ 
(Neuwirth, 2006).  The installing of gas pipes in Sultanbeyli represents a fairly bold statement 
indicating the community‘s desire to throw off a traditional neighborhood norm for modern 
convenience.  If nothing else, this statement serves as further indication that the residents of 
Sultanbeyli live according to a higher standard of living than the average informal settlement. 
 
Figure 5.3: Businesses along Fatih Boulevard, Sultanbeyli 
(Sultanbeylİ turkcell extra, n.d.) 
 
 
                                               
28
 See Figure 5.3 
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Physical Infrastructure 
 
Assessing the physical infrastructure of Sultanbeyli is particularly interesting because 
there is some conflict within the literature.  Neuwirth‘s initial characterization of Sultanbeyli is 
as ―indistinguishable from the legal neighborhoods of the city‖ (2006).  This statement seems to 
indicate that Sultanbeyli is physically similar to the average Turkish city, a presumably good 
physical condition.  Additionally, photographs from Sultanbeyli seem to confirm this 
assumption.  However, further research proves that ―indistinguishable‖ from the legal 
neighborhoods of the city does not mean that Sultanbeyli is without infrastructure concerns.  In 
discussing the evolution of neighborhoods in Istanbul, Tugal notes that there are ―signs of 
extreme poverty still visible in Sultanbeyli—schools without running water, unpaved roads‖ 
(Tugal, 2008).  Both schools without running water and unpaved roads constitute concerns with 
physical infrastructure (public facilities and transportation infrastructure), but the assertion that 
they represent signs of extreme poverty is an overstatement.  Within the context of informal 
settlements, some unpaved roads is significantly better than no paved roads.  Similarly, the 
presence of schools and public facilities is a distinguishing factor from many informal 
settlements.  Furthermore, the former local administration focused heavily on fostering the 
development of public amenities: 
 
―‘I want Sultanbeyli to be very aesthetic,‘ former Mayor Karakaya said. ‗I want 
more leisure and modern things, more teahouses and parks and public services.‘ 
While he was Mayor, he allocated the money for eight public parks to be 
constructed and trees to be planted on major streets. And he was starting to look at 
funding social and economic programs, like carnivals and markets‖ (Neuwirth, 
2007). 
 
This level of investment in public facilites is a telling indication of the comparative levels of 
development of Sultanbeyli and other informal settlements.  Surely these infrastructure concerns 
(schools without running water and unpaved roads) are of note, but in comparison to Kibera‘s 
physical infrastructure Sultanbeyli is undeniably better off.  Thus, based on Neuwirth and 
Tugal‘s characterizations and Figures 5.2-5.4, the physical infrastructure of Sultanbeyli is good. 
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Figure 5.4: Sultanbeyli from Above 
(Sultanbeyli tem otoyolu, n.d.) 
 
Land Tenure 
 
The structure of land tenure in Sultanbeyli is largely affected by the historical systems 
of governance in Turkey and Istanbul.  Prior to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and 
the subsequent adoption of Roman laws, Ottoman laws governed the area that is now Turkey for 
many years.  Despite the adoption of Roman laws many Ottoman traditions remained.  This 
resulted in a complex, hybrid system of governance where Roman laws essentially ―lay on top‖ 
of Ottoman traditions (Neuwirth, 2006).  How these two systems interact with respect to land 
tenure and property ownership is particularly fascinating.  Roman law is based in and endorses 
private ownership, whereas Ottoman tradition is quite the opposite.   
In the Ottoman Empire, all land belonged to the Sultan, and the Sultan would grant 
land to favored subjects, to which they had the right to collect rents (Neuwirth, 2006).  This right 
could be sold or passed on to heirs, but the land remained the property of the Sultan and the 
Sultan could revoke any granted right to said land at will (Neuwirth, 2006).  The tenants who 
rented on the land, however, were provided a modicum of protection through permanent leases 
known as tapu (Inalcik & Quataert, 1994).  Tapu is a principal piece of the complex, pragmatic 
Ottoman property system.  What tapu represented in the Ottoman Empire was the usufructuary 
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right to a plot of land, not ownership.  Interestingly, this right was not revocable by the Sultan 
and could be passed on to descendants (Inalcik & Quataert 1994, Neuwirth 2006).  Of course, 
this right was not free, tapu was granted in return for the meeting of a series of fiscal obligations 
and a pledge to cultivate the land continuously (Inalcik & Quataert, 1994).  Tapu was designed to 
ensure that the land within the Ottoman Empire was used efficiently toward the Sultan‘s goals, 
namely the growth of the Empire: ―the laws regarding land were designed to keep farmers 
farming, soldiers fighting, and the empire growing‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  In practice, the Ottoman 
land laws established a cultural and historical base for the development for informal settlements 
as they encouraged citizens to occupy vacant parcels as long as the land was put to use 
(Neuwirth, 2006). 
With the adoption of Roman laws, the legal concept of tapu became a gray area.  The 
vast majority
29
 of land in the Turkish Republic was occupied according to the many incarnations 
of tapu, a concept that held no legal bearing in the new tenure system, leaving a significant 
percentage of the population in a legally precarious position.  The largest portion of Istanbul‘s 
land, including Sultanbeyli, is held in hisseli tapu, or ―shared title.‖  It‘s not specifically 
enumerated how hisseli tapu came to exist, but the working definition is comically complicated.  
As described by Mustafa Karataş, former press secretary of Sultanbeyli, ―There might be 
thousands of shares.  It‘s not even certain how many square meters is one share.  And even if you 
had one share, you could have built on five‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  For a number of reasons, the 
majority of the people who occupy hisseli tapu land are not shareowners, and most of the 
shareowners probably have no idea they are (Neuwirth, 2006).  Absent private ownership, the 
current land tenure system ideally works like this: for a prospective resident to build in 
Sultanbeyli, he or she pays for a ruhsat, or a document that gives him or her permission to build 
from the municipal planning department—this does not grant him or her tapu, simply permission 
to build (Neuwirth, 2006).  Of course, not everyone pays for a ruhsat before building, and 
traditional gecekondu methods prevail in the absence of this assured right to build (Neuwirth, 
2006).  The net result of both methods, however, is the same—300,000 people on land that does 
not formally belong to them.  That being said, it is clear that Turkish laws and customs afford 
                                               
29
 In the waning years of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan attempted to secure support 
through different means, one being the granting of land ownership. 
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Sultanbeyli‘s residents a significant amount of tenure security because they have a high level of 
confidence in their right to occupy and use their lands.  To characterize the tenure security in 
Sultanbeyli, it is de facto, quasi-formal, and fairly secure. 
Moving forward Sultanbeyli intends to transition to ifrazli tapu--private ownership.  Of 
course the current system complicates the implementation of this transition.  The municipal 
government‘s plan of action is to research the hisseli tapu owners, buy them out, and sell the 
land, complete with title, to the current occupiers (Neuwirth, 2006).  A complicated process, but 
the government is convinced the transition to private ownership will only move Sultanbeyli 
forward.  There are concerns, however, with whether or not this moving forward will also 
include Sultanbeyli‘s current citizens (Neuwirth, 2006).  Among the most pressing concerns, 
private ownership may set off a wave of speculation within Sultanbeyli that could heavily 
gentrify the area.  Even more basic, not all citizens can afford to buy their tapu
30
.  Although 
counterintuitive, it is entirely possible that with the advent of ifrazli tapu, the tenure security in 
Sultanbeyli may actually decrease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30
 For in depth discussion, see Neuwirth, R. (2006). Shadow Cities. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
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Figure 5.5: Gecekondu in Istanbul 
(Kaptan, 2007) 
 
 
Housing Unit 
 
Housing units in Sultanbeyli take many different forms.  As Aylin Brigitte Yildrim notes 
in ―Informal Settlements in Turkey-Gecekondu in Istanbul and Alternative Solutions to 
Redevelopment,‖ gecekondu can be divided into sub-categories: frozen gecekondu, post-
gecekondu, apartmankondu and varoş (2008).  Frozen gecekondu refers to gecekondu that are 
still in their original shape as it pertains to structures, and shape patterns.  Post-gecekondu refers 
to the ―next step‖ evolution in gecekondu where small-scale multi-unit structures have replaced 
the majority of the original gecekondu.  Apartmankondu refers to the large, informal, multi-story 
apartment complexes commonly found in urban areas (Yildirim, 2008).  Varoş refer to slum-like 
gecekondu areas characterized by inferior building quality (Yildrim, 2008).  Sultanbeyli, a 
roughly 50 km
2
 area, is composed by an interesting mix of all types of gecekondu structures.  
The majority of the construction in Sultanbeyli post 1980 has taken the form of post-gecekondu 
and apartmankondu, although there are still some areas that can be classified as frozen 
gecekondu.  In exploring Orhangazi, one of the newer neighborhoods of Sultanbeyli, Robert 
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Neuwirth stated that ―the frenzy of urbanization can‘t mask a village atmosphere‖ (2006).  In 
Orhangazi, the homes are ―undeniably spartan: simple single-story buildings, hardly more than 
poured concrete frames with windows‖ (Neuwirth, 2006).  Clearly, within Sultanbeyli there is a 
diverse mix of housing units.  For this report, however, it is important to discuss how the housing 
units in Sultanbeyli relate to the characteristics of durable housing as outlined in Table 2.3—this 
comparison is shown in Table 5.4.  In short, many of the structural characteristics discussed 
cannot be definitively discussed because they are unique to the individual housing unit.  In the 
case of frozen gecekondu, the structure must be permament and has to be in good condition, 
otherwise it would be torn down.  However, whether or not this is in a flood plain, on a steep 
slope, in a dangerous right of way, or in compliance with building codes is a matter of individual 
investigation.  If building codes exist for an area, then any new gecekondu must be in 
compliance with these building codes—the same goes for post-gecekondu and apartmankondu.  
Presumably, any investment at the scale of post-gecekondu and apartmankondu would occur in 
non-hazardous areas, but this assumption cannot be confirmed.  However, in overview, based on 
Table 5.4 and discussion contained in the Literature, the housing units of Sultanbeyli are fairly 
good within the context of informal settlements. 
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Table 5.4: Adapted Characteristics of Durable Housing Units in Sultanbeyli 
Structure 
Type 
Permanency Physical State 
Environmental 
Security 
Frozen 
Gecekondu 
Minimally 
permanent. 
Potentially 
dilapidated, but 
required to provide 
adequate 
environmental 
protection by law. 
Situational, but 
typically moderately 
secure. 
Post-gecekondu Permanent. Potentially 
dilapidated, but of 
relatively recent 
construction and 
typically in fair 
condition. 
Secure. 
Apartmankondu Permanent. Potentially 
dilapidated, but of 
recent construction 
and typically in good 
condition. 
Secure. 
Varoş Questionable. Typically in disrepair 
and dilapidated. 
Questionable. 
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Neighborhood Unit 
 
Discussing Sultanbeyli as a neighborhood unit is difficult.  Sultanbeyli is a district 
composed of many neighborhoods, or mahalles (quarters), and spans a roughly 50 km
2
 area 
which is about 20 times the size of Kibera.  While Sultanbeyli dwarfs Kibera and has more 
opportunity to statistically distribute its population, the density of Sultanbeyli is significantly 
better than that of Kibera at 6,000 persons per km
2
.  This disparity is shown in Figure 5.6, an 
aerial photo of Sultanbeyli.  As Figures 5.2-4 show, Sultanbeyli is a typical urban setting of good 
visual character, nearly indistinguishable from the formal urban areas of Istanbul.   
 
Figure 5.6: Aerial photograph of Sultanbeyli
31
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31
 Taken from google.com/maps at a scale of 1‖-200‘ 
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Concluding Comments 
 
The living conditions of Sultanbeyli as discussed within this case study differ starkly with 
those of Kibera.  The acceptable access to water and sanitation, and the quality housing units, 
neighborhoods exhibited within Sultanbeyli are well within the acceptable urban living 
conditions laid out in the conceptual framework discussed in the literature review of this report.  
Additionally, this particular case study highlights a significant difference in the relationship 
between Sultanbeyli‘s residents and the overarching administrative bodies in Sultanbeyli as 
compared to the same relationship in Kibera.  Through the protections provided to gecekondu 
housing, the political representation, and the general level of accountability Sultanbeyli‘s 
administrators must possess is a key difference in how living conditions manifest within a 
community. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions 
As characterized in Chapters 4 and 5, Sultanbeyli and Kibera are distinct communities 
with essentially unique conditions, challenges, and concerns.  Sultanbeyli is a community on the 
rise with respectable infrastructure and public services, secure land tenure, and administrative 
legitimacy.  Kibera, on the other hand, is a community that struggles with sanitation, 
overcrowding, political and administrative corruption, and insecure land tenure.  As this case 
study shows, it is clearly naïve to assume that all informal settlements are of the same settlement 
typology.  Rather, informal development manifests in many, quite different ways according to 
conditions and processes at work within each settlement.  However, despite this essential 
uniqueness, this report‘s case study of Kibera and Sultanbeyli does indicate some similarities in 
the nature and development of the two settlements.  Moreover, through identifying these 
similarities and differences, this report gains significant insight into the processes driving 
informal development, and how factors affect the manifestation of this development.  
Accordingly, Chapter 6 of this report first discusses the key similarities in the development of 
Kibera and Sultanbeyli. In identifying these similarities, this report outlines initial indications of 
what conditions and factors appear to aid in the driving and continued proliferation of informal 
development.  Furthermore, this will contribute to the knowledge base that will eventually 
provide planners and social scientists with the tools to proactively assess specific areas‘ 
likelihood to develop informally based on the conditions they observe.  Similarly, this report also 
attempts to identify the key differences between Kibera and Sultanbeyli.  In examining these 
differences, this report‘s case study highlights how three specific factors—the relationship 
between the residents and the administration, land tenure security, and settlement context—affect 
living conditions within a settlement.  Understanding the relationship between these factors and 
how informal development manifests provides planners and social scientists with a clear view of 
how to efficiently intervene in informal development to combat slum living conditions.  There is 
significant inquiry and investigation that remains to be done to definitively confirm these 
findings and their applicability to informal development as a whole, as opposed to just a 
comparison of Kibera and Sultanbeyli.  However, these findings are significant enough within 
the context of this report to allow for a hypothetical application to the larger concept of informal 
development.  Ultimately, this chapter presents the trends identified within this case study in the 
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context of how they can be scaled-up, and applied to informal development as a whole, while 
recognizing that they are initial findings.  Both the similarities and differences of Kibera and 
Sultanbeyli are discussed within this chapter according to larger scales, examining the origins of 
informal development and examining the determinants of living conditions, respectively.   
 
Examining the Origins of Informal Development 
 
A key function of this report‘s case study is to attempt to identify what factors aid in the 
driving and continued proliferation of informal development.  To this aim, two specific trends 
exhibited in both Kibera and Sultanbeyli provide a strong indication of being key factors in 
fueling informal development.  Firstly, large and rapid population influx plays a key role in the 
development of both Kibera and Sultanbeyli.  Secondly, in combination with this population 
influx, the capacity of the formal housing and land markets in both Nairobi and Istanbul could 
not provide for their populations.  An excellent example of how the formal framework and 
development interact is explained in Do Urban Land Regulations Influence Slum Formation? 
(2006).  In their report, the authors plainly indicate a key assumption in their research is that 
when residents can‘t enter the formal housing/land market, housing demand is met via informal 
solutions (Lall, Wang, & de Mata, 2006).  This means that there is a direct connection between 
the growth of informal development and a settlement‘s formal housing options:  as formal 
options decrease, informal development increases.  Interestingly, this report‘s case study 
illustrates that there are many, less obvious means, in which the formal framework and housing 
access is inadequate.  The early booms in Kibera‘s development occurred outside Nairobi‘s city 
limits as rural populations migrated to Nairobi for work. Because the British Colonial Authority 
restricted movement in and out of Nairobi, the majority of this settlement occurred unregulated 
outside the city limits.  In Sultanbeyli, as the populations of Istanbul swelled in the 1980‘s, the 
traditional shared title land ownership system held over from the Ottoman Empire was nowhere 
near nimble enough to keep pace with the population changes.  Coupled with the administrative 
protection provided to gecekondu settlers, housing and land titles became increasingly 
convoluted and irrelevant.  In this way, the large growth in informal development that 
established both Kibera and Sultanbeyli originated in a fundamental disparity in what the 
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respective formal frameworks of each area could, or was willing to provide and what was 
necessary for the area.   
This case study supports previous research observations that access to and the availability 
of formal housing and land in a given area is the key factor driving informal development.  
Furthermore, this case study also highlights that informal development occurs when access to 
and the availability of formal housing and land is greatly stressed by population influx.  Thus, 
this case study‘s findings indicate that areas prone to large population influxes and generally 
inadequate formal housing and land options and access exhibit the key conditions that fuels and 
proliferates the growth of informal development.  As this case study shows, however, this 
inadequacy may take many forms, ranging from numeric housing shortages to highly politicized 
ethnic underrepresentation.  In the hypothetical application to informal development as a whole, 
this case study‘s initial findings allow planners and social scientists to proactively assess areas 
around the world and determine if the area exhibits a propensity or vulnerability for informal 
development, and identify if steps can and should be taken to regularize this development. 
Examining the Determinants of Living Conditions 
 
While there is merit in fostering understanding of the forces at work in driving and 
proliferating informal development, it is equally important to ascertain what and how factors 
affect how this development manifests.  This case study paints a picture of two communities, 
linked by a common definition, that exhibit distinctly different living conditions.  Accordingly, 
this case study is particularly concerned with attempting to understand what factors affect living 
conditions, and how they affect them.  Through exploring the differences between Kibera and 
Sultanbeyli, three key factors affecting living conditions emerge: the relationship between the 
residents and the administration, land tenure security, and settlement context. 
Diagramming the relationship between the administration of a settlement and its residents 
is extremely important in understanding how the two parties interact and how this affects 
development.  This report‘s case study of Kibera and Sultanbeyli highlights the impact of this 
relationship on living conditions.  To characterize the relationship between residents and 
administrations in both Kibera and Sultanbeyli, it is exploitative and collaborative, respectively.  
In Kibera, the administrative structure is confusing and inefficient, and all too often, no one 
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knows what agency or administrative body is responsible for providing a given service to Kibera.  
As an unofficial settlement, however, there is little recourse for not providing these services.  
Furthermore, the convoluted and overlapping administrative entities and lack of accountability 
creates a government that is rife with corruption that in turn, engenders a hostile relationship 
between Kibera‘s residents and administrative officials.  Recently, aspiring politicians have 
begun to recognize Kibera as a heavily concentrated voting bloc; most notably spearheaded by 
the efforts of current Prime Minister Raila Odinga, whose parliamentary district of district of 
Langata encompasses Kibera (Kenyan premier leads Nairobi slum dwellers in relocation 
exercise, 2009).  Efforts like KENSUP, highly touted by the current administration and Prime 
Minister Odinga, are in constant danger of exploitation for political posturing that undermines 
their effectiveness.  In short, Kibera is only selectively relevant in the administrative bodies‘ 
eyes: good for votes, but a forgettable inconvenience otherwise.  Geoffrey Barasa Wafubwa, 
Kibera resident, provides a striking summarization about the relationship between Kibera‘s 
residents and the overarching administrative bodies: ―The government claims the land is forest.  
When they come to ask for votes from the forest, we are suddenly changed from trees to people.  
But legally, we are just trees‖ (Neuwirth, Shadow Cities, 2006). 
Conversely, Sultanbeyli‘s residents enjoy a significantly better and more collaborative 
relationship with the administrations of Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, and Turkey.  Early on, politicians 
recognized the value of mobilizing and concentrating a large population like Sultanbeyli toward 
an officially recognized municipal entity.  The administrative structure in Turkey allows 
communities to mobilize and apply to become recognized municipal entities, and this opens the 
door to many benefits that unrecognized communities cannot receive, most notably, funding, 
services, and powers, including the right to collect taxes supported by a legitimate and legally 
defensible judicial branch.  Furthermore, this case study of Kibera and Sultanbeyli underlines the 
importance of trust and quid pro quo in the relationship between a population and the 
administrative bodies that oversee it.  In a collaborative environment, Sultanbeyli‘s residents 
give the administrative entities votes, money, and license to operate contingent upon 
representation and confidence that the administrations have the community‘s best interests in 
mind.  Part and parcel with these concessions, the residents of Sultanbeyli hold the 
administrations accountable by what they actually do for the community.  As this relationship 
prospers, the community prospers, and this is reflected in living conditions.  
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The second key factor affecting living conditions within an informal settlement is land 
tenure security.  This case study of Kibera and Sultanbeyli reinforces the view of current 
literature that places a lot of importance on the role of land tenure security in the determination 
of living conditions.  Both residents of Kibera and Sultanbeyli have modicums of formality in 
their land tenure systems.  In Kibera, the power to give permission for temporary structures 
resides with local chieftains in the Provincial Administration.  In Sultanbeyli, residents can buy 
tapu, documents that are similar to deeds or title.  Where these two options differ, however, is in 
the security that each provides to the residents.  As illustrated in this case study, Kibera‘s 
residents are at the mercy of the agents of the Provincial Administration.  Though these residents 
have permission to build temporary structures, the Provincial Administration as well as the 
Nairobi City Council and the Kenyan government can evict the residents and destroy these 
structures at will.  This position has been reinforced by periodic attempts to destroy the 
settlement throughout its history.  This lack of security has a profound effect on the living 
conditions of a settlement.  This sentiment is best reflected in the comments recorded by Robert 
Neuwirth in his time in Kibera.  When asked what would happen if he was secure in the 
knowledge that he would not be evicted, Michael Owaga Obera, Kibera resident, responded 
with: ―You‘ll never believe it.  You come back in five years and you won‘t believe it.  I‘ll make 
sure you feel somebody is living here‖ (Shadow Cities, 2006).  Ultimately, the connection 
between land tenure and living conditions is anchored in a firm belief in the oft-discussed ―self-
help‖ attitude of slum peoples.  While this view may be tainted by romanticism, it is supported 
by an observable trend that is exhibited in this case study; insecure tenure is a strong deterrent to 
any ―self-help‖ improvements for fear of losing that investment, as is the case in Kibera.  
Securing land tenure removes the barriers to incremental, ―self-help‖ improvements to structures 
and infrastructure.  As the ever-evolving and improving gecekondu of Turkey show, widespread 
incremental, ―self-help‖ improvements have the potential to significantly elevate the living 
conditions of an informal settlement. 
The third key factor in affecting living conditions, as evidenced by this case study of 
Kibera and Sultanbeyli, is context.  A quick comparison of economic contexts drawn from this 
case study of Kibera in Sultanbeyli illustrates how context affects living conditions in informal 
development.  As Table 6.1 shows, the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) of both Nairobi and 
Kenya represents a fraction of the respective GDP‘s in Istanbul and Turkey.  Moreover, when 
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rationalized by population, the GDP dollars per person in Nairobi is $10,000 less than that of 
Istanbul, though Kenya is only slightly lower than Turkey in the same comparison.  What these 
figures indicate is the global economic position of these larger entities, particularly highlighting 
the general disparity in economic production and wealth in Nairobi and Istanbul.  While these 
GDP figures are far from perfect as a measure of wealth, it creates an important distinction 
between the Sultanbeyli and Kibera contained within these larger administrative entities.  
Istanbul and Turkey are comparatively wealthier than Nairobi and Kenya, and this undoubtedly 
plays a part in shaping the economic conditions within Kibera and Sultanbeyli.  Furthermore, 
these economic conditions play a major role in determining how informal development 
manifests.  Of course economic conditions aren‘t they only context-related issues that bear on a 
settlement‘s development.  Cultural roots in nomadic trading, historical exposure and experience 
with market economic constructs, and levels of cultural isolation are all examples of how 
essentially unique contexts for a given settlement bear heavily on living conditions and how a 
settlement develops.  It is therefore a key realization brought to light by this case study that 
researchers must recognize and temper any sweeping conclusions about informal development 
within the unique context of the settlement(s), so as not to attribute or fail to attribute 
significance to specific pieces of a study‘s findings.  Furthermore, carefully weighing context 
may point to additional factors that are contributing to or amplifying a given trend observed in 
one particular settlement.  In the case of Kibera, these figures provide an initial indication that 
the disparity between wealth in urban and rural areas is a large driving factor in the proliferation 
of informal settlements within Nairobi, and in turn, Kibera.  This is in keeping with the Harris-
Todaro model of rural-urban migration discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 6.1: Economic Context Comparison
32
 
Place GDP (in US Dollars) Population GDP/Person 
Nairobi $12,000,000,000 3,138,369 $3,824 
Istanbul $182,000,000,000 13,120,596 $13,871 
Kenya $29,800,000,000 39,802,015 $749 
Turkey $614,600,000,000 74,815,703 $8,215 
 
Implications on Interfacing with Informal Development 
 
 As global urbanization trends continue, planners and social scientists will have an 
increasingly large responsibility to efficiently and sensitively address informal development.  
This case study provides key insights that allow for initial conclusions on the origins of informal 
development and the factors affecting living conditions within informal settlements.  In 
identifying the key similarities between Kibera and Sultanbeyli, particularly regarding the origins 
of informal development, this case study provides essential insight into what conditions create 
informal development.  This understanding, while still nebulous, provides planners and social 
scientists with a basic metric with which to try and identify areas in which these conditions exist.  
In essence, this research provides planners and social scientists with preliminary tools to begin 
addressing the growth of informal development proactively and to gauge how and if planners 
should intervene to regularize development. 
 Identifying the key factors accounting for the different manifestations of informal 
development provides an initial framework for how planners and social scientists can effectively 
address living conditions in existing informal development.  By ultimately recognizing how 
these key identified factors affect living conditions, planners and social scientists can focus their 
efforts in areas in which they will be most effective.  While many planners and social scientists 
are largely concerned with slum-upgrading, it is a process that must be approached sensitively.  
                                               
32
 Population counts retrieved from respective country censuses.  Country GDP‘s 
retrieved from The World Bank Development Indicators (2009). City GDP‘s from 
Price Waterhouse Cooper‘s UK Economic Outlook (2009). 
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There are many cultural customs and deeply rooted personal connections to communities and 
homes, and outside influence is rarely welcomed.  As global aims such as the Millennium 
Development Goals continue, planners and social scientists must learn to interface with informal 
settlements effectively, efficiently, and sensitively.  In recognizing that an accountable, 
trustworthy, and collaborative administrative structure is extremely important for improving 
living conditions, planners and social scientists can focus on building administrative capacity.  
They can examine where the administrative structure is currently failing, and work toward 
addressing these issues.  Similarly, with the knowledge that land tenure security is key for 
developing improved living conditions, planners and social scientists can develop sensitive ways 
in which to secure land tenure and remove residents‘ barriers to incremental, ―self-help‖ 
improvements.  This research also underlines the importance of recognizing and embracing the 
essential uniqueness of informal settlements.  Though certain trends are exhibited throughout 
informal development, the factors and conditions motivating these trends must be considered 
within the context of the individual settlements so as not to attribute or fail to attribute 
significance to a study‘s findings.  It is therefore important for planners and social scientists to 
recognize how this context affects living conditions in a given settlement and tailor their efforts 
with this context deliberately in mind. 
 In summation, this exploratory research provides a holistic view of how two informal 
settlements originated, and how different factors affect each community‘s living conditions.  
Through these insights, this report develops initial conclusions about the conditions motivating 
informal development, how different factors affect living conditions in informal settlements, and 
what implications this relationship has for planners and social scientists.  The case study 
contained within this report highlights specific factors—the relationship between the residents 
and the administration, land tenure security, and settlement context—and how each affects living 
conditions within a settlement.  The initial findings of this case study indicate that planners can 
efficiently intervene to combat slum living conditions through helping to build administrative 
capacities, helping to develop secure land tenure, and/or addressing unique contextual issues 
affecting essentially unique settlements.  But ultimately these findings must be tempered by the 
limitations of this study.  As is the nature of both exploratory and explanatory case study, the 
conclusions of this case study, as applied to the larger concept of informal development are best 
described as testable hypotheses.  This general and nebulous understanding of the origins of 
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informal development and the determinants of living conditions in informal development provide 
a strong base upon which planners and social scientists can elevate the collective understanding 
of informal development.  This research provides suggestions as to how planners and social 
scientists can revise programs and efforts to sensitively and effectively interact with informal 
development in an increasingly informally developing world. 
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